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AVERTING EDUCATIONAL CRISIS: FUNDING 
CUTS, TEACHER SHORTAGES, AND THE 
DWINDLING COMMITMENT TO PUBLIC 
EDUCATION 
DEREK W. BLACK

 
ABSTRACT 
Recent data shows that two-thirds of states are funding education at 
lower levels than in 2008. Some states are 20% or more below levels of 
just a few years earlier. The effect on schools has been devastating. States 
are only exacerbating the problem by reducing teachers’ rights and 
benefits. These attacks, combined with funding decreases, have scared 
many prospective teachers away from the profession. The net result is an 
extreme shortage of teachers nationwide. When the school year began in 
2015, a large number of public schools opened without enough certified 
teachers to fill classrooms, relying instead on substitutes and interns on a 
full-time basis. In other instances, schools stopped offering certain 
classes. Decades of social science research demonstrate that these funding 
and teaching policies will have serious academic impacts on students. 
They will likely widen achievement gaps and impose learning deficits that 
some students will never overcome.  
In the face of analogous threats, courts in the past have regularly 
intervened to protect educational quality and funding. Yet this time 
around, courts have increasingly refused to intervene and have rarely 
offered a compelling reason for the refusal. This judicial passivism 
towards education marks a troubling new trend. It suggests that the 
constitutional right to education may exist only in theory, and that 
students are losing the constitutional leverage to demand that states repair 
the damage that they have caused. Likewise, nothing will prevent states 
from pursuing similar retractions again in the future. 
This Article offers a new doctrinal approach to reverse both 
educational retractions and judicial disengagement. Current trends, 
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research and analysis of the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities.  Without it, I do not know whether 
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however, cannot be reversed without acknowledging the potential limits of 
judicial intervention during crisis. In particular, a serious crisis incites 
fear and political expediency, which can prompt legislatures to ignore 
court orders that purport to remedy the crisis. This disregard is inherently 
problematic for both education rights and the basic legitimacy of judicial 
authority, regardless of the subject matter. In this respect, the solution to 
the devaluation of education rights is also a step toward strengthening 
judicial authority. In education, courts must begin to incorporate 
prospective doctrines and rules that reduce the likelihood of judicial 
standoffs with legislatures. In short, future court orders should seek to 
avert crises by addressing them before they occur. This Article proposes 
three specific steps courts can take to achieve this end.  
INTRODUCTION 
In the Fall of 2015, extreme teacher shortages swept the nation, 
revealing that the education crisis that began during the Great Recession is 
far from over.
1
 From 2008 to 2012, nearly every state imposed budget cuts 
on education.
2
 Cuts of more than $1,000 per pupil in a single year were 
routine—the equivalent of an assistant teacher in every classroom or the 
entire science and foreign language departments combined.
3
 Some states 
experienced massive cuts for multiple years. In North Carolina and 
Florida, per-pupil funding fell from over $10,000 to the $7,000 range in 
just a few years.
4
 These funding cuts affected a wide array of educational 
services, but the most significant were regarding teachers. Layoffs, pay 
 
 
 1. Motoko Rich, Teacher Shortages Spur a Nationwide Hiring Scramble (Credentials 
Optional), N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 9, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/10/us/teacher-shortages-spur-
a-nationwide-hiring-scramble-credentials-optional.html. Similar shortages resurfaced in the fall of 
2016. Linda Darling-Hammond et al., The Answer To Teacher Shortages: Creating a Sustainable 
Profession, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 3, 2016) http://www.huffingtonpost.com/linda-darlinghammond/ 
the-answer-to-teacher-sho_b_12319698.html.  
 2. NOELLE M. ELLERSON, AM. ASS’N OF SCH. ADMINS., A CLIFF HANGER: HOW AMERICA’S 
PUBLIC SCHOOLS CONTINUE TO FEEL THE IMPACT OF THE ECONOMIC DOWNTURN 8 (2010), 
https://www.aasa.org/uploadedFiles/Policy_and_Advocacy/files/CliffHangerFINAL(1).pdf (66% of 
districts reported cuts to state and local revenues between 2008 and 2009 and 80% reported cuts 
between 2009 and 2010). 
 3. BRUCE D. BAKER ET AL., IS SCHOOL FUNDING FAIR? A NATIONAL REPORT CARD 12–13 t.2 
(3d ed. 2014), http://www.schoolfundingfairness.org/National_Report_Card_2014.pdf; Marguerite 
Roza, Breaking Down School Budgets, 9 EDUC. NEXT 29 (Summer 2009), http://educationnext.org/ 
breaking-down-school-budgets-2/ (specifying programing costs in public schools). 
 4. BRUCE D. BAKER ET AL., IS SCHOOL FUNDING FAIR? A NATIONAL REPORT CARD 8 (4th ed. 
2015), http://www.schoolfundingfairness.org/National_Report_Card_2015.pdf. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol94/iss2/7
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cuts, and new, high-stakes accountability systems dissuaded the next 
generation of talent from even pursuing a teaching career.
5
  
As states finally began to replenish their teaching ranks in 2015, they 
found that teachers were in very short supply. In many instances, districts 
struggled to hire even the most minimally qualified individuals. Just to 
ensure warm bodies in the classroom, districts resorted to desperate 
measures—billboard advertising, hiring substitutes and college interns on 
a full-time basis, and seeking district-wide exemptions from teacher 
certification requirements.
6
 In some districts, these drastic measures were 
not enough to stop class cancelations and teaching overloads.
7
 The 
teaching demand in California, for instance, is 40% higher than the supply 
of individuals seeking teaching credentials this year.
8
 Current projections 
indicate the shortage will get worse before it gets better.
9
 
This crisis cannot simply be written off to the recession and its after-
effects. At the same time that states were making cuts to traditional public 
education, they were enacting huge increases for charter schools and 
voucher programs.
10
 The recession may have necessitated some cuts and 
efficiencies in public education, but many states appear to have used the 
 
 
 5. Derek W. Black, The Constitutional Challenge to Teacher Tenure, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 75 
(2016) (describing new teacher evaluation systems and changes to hiring, firing, and tenure policies); 
EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, INVESTING IN OUR FUTURE: RETURNING TEACHERS TO THE 
CLASSROOM (2012), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/Investing_in_Our_Future_Report. 
pdf [hereinafter INVESTING IN OUR FUTURE] (reporting a loss of 300,000 teachers); MARJORIE A. 
SUCKOW & ROXANN L. PURDUE, CAL. COMM’N ON TEACHER CREDENTIALING, TEACHER SUPPLY IN 
CALIFORNIA: A REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE ANNUAL REPORT 2013–2014 16 (2015), 
http://www.ctc.ca.gov/reports/TS-2013-2014-AnnualRpt.pdf (finding a 55% drop over five years in 
the number of persons pursuing and completing education degrees in California). 
 6. See, e.g., STATE OF CAL. COMM’N ON TEACHER CREDENTIALING, DISTRICT INTERN 
CREDENTIALS 3 (2015) (permitting interns to teach after 120 hours of training or six credit hours of 
course work); Andrea Eger & Nour Habib, Crisis Hits Oklahoma Classrooms with Teacher Shortage, 
Quality Concerns, TULSA WORLD (Aug. 16, 2015), http://www.tulsaworld.com/news/education/crisis-
hits-oklahoma-classrooms-with-teacher-shortage-quality-concerns/article_54627559-bcc0-5ae5-b654-
9b7eec46ab3c.html (in a month and a half, the Oklahoma Department of Education received 526 
requests for teacher certification exemptions); Kristen A. Graham, Looking for a Few Thousand 
Substitute Teachers, PHILLY (Sept. 1, 2015), http://articles.philly.com/2015-09-01/news/66074823_1_ 
retired-teachers-subs-philadelphia-teachers. 
 7. Eger & Habib, supra note 6; Rebecca Klein, Kansas Underfunded Education and Cut 
Tenure. Now It Can’t Find Enough Teachers to Fill Classrooms, HUFFINGTON POST (July 31, 2015), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/kansas-teacher-shortage_us_55b913ebe4b0074ba5a729d5 (reporting 
school district started year with uncertified teachers and had to use substitutes). 
 8. Rich, supra note 1 (state issued 15,000 teaching credentials, which was 6,500 short of the 
open teaching positions). 
 9. See TITLE II HIGHER EDUCATION ACT, DATA TOOLS, https://title2.ed.gov/Public/DataTools/ 
Tables.aspx (last visited Nov. 23, 2015) (finding a sharp drop in the number of students pursuing 
education degrees); SUCKOW & PURDUE, supra note 5. 
 10. See infra notes 61–91. 
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recession as a convenient means to redefine their commitment to public 
education. Indeed, the presence of a substantive shift in commitment is 
becoming clearer with each passing year. By 2012, state revenues 
rebounded to pre-recession levels,
11
 but as of 2015, thirty-one states were 
still funding education below pre-recession levels.
12
 Compared to the past 
sixty years of recessions and school funding, the current state of affairs is 
“unprecedented.”13 
The negative effects of reducing education funding and teacher quality 
are well documented. Decades of studies indicate that money does, in fact, 
matter to educational outcomes.
14
 The latest research leaves no doubt: a 
substantial portion of the achievement gap between middle- and low-
income students is attributable to school funding inequality.
15
 Even clearer 
is the social science consensus that teacher quality is the most significant 
variable in student achievement.
16
 Thus, as class size goes up while 
teacher quality goes down, states threaten to exacerbate an already wide 
achievement gap, particularly in poorer schools.
17
 
Courts’ refusals to seriously entertain constitutional violations, or 
intervene when they occur, undermines the constitutional right to 
education itself and makes the reoccurrence of future crises more likely. In 
past decades, state supreme courts regularly struck down education 
policies and practices that undermined educational opportunity.
18
 All fifty 
state constitutions obligate the state to provide education to students.
19
 A 
 
 
 11. BAKER ET AL., supra note 4, at 20. 
 12. MICHAEL LEACHMAN ET AL., CTR. ON BUDGET AND POL’Y PRIORITIES, MOST STATES HAVE 
CUT SCHOOL FUNDING, AND SOME CONTINUE CUTTING 1 (Jan. 25, 2016), http://www.cbpp.org/ 
sites/default/files/atoms/files/12-10-15sfp.pdf. 
 13. INVESTING IN OUR FUTURE, supra note 5, at 4–5. 
 14. BRUCE BAKER, THE ALBERT SHANKER INST., REVISITING THAT AGE-OLD QUESTION: DOES 
MONEY MATTER IN EDUCATION? 3–6 (2012), http://www.shankerinstitute.org/sites/shanker/files/ 
moneymatters_edition2.pdf.  
 15. C. Kirabo Jackson et al., The Effect of School Finance Reforms on the Distribution of 
Spending, Academic Achievement, and Adult Outcomes, Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working 
Paper No. 20118, http://www.nber.org/papers/w20118. 
 16. Linda Darling-Hammond, Teacher Quality and Student Achievement: A Review of State 
Policy Evidence, 8 EDUC. POL’Y ANALYSIS ARCHIVES 1 (2000); James H. Stronge et al., What Is the 
Relationship Between Teacher Quality and Student Achievement? An Exploratory Study, 20 J. PERS. 
EVALUATION EDUC. 165, 167 (2007). 
 17. See EDUC. TR. THEIR FAIR SHARE: HOW TEXAS-SIZED GAPS IN TEACHER QUALITY 
SHORTCHANGE LOW-INCOME AND MINORITY STUDENTS 2 (2008), http://edtrust.org/wp-content/ 
uploads/2013/10/TXTheirFairShare.pdf ([A]assigning low-performing students to a series of 
ineffective teachers is ‘education deadly.’). 
 18. Joshua E. Weishart, Transcending Equality Versus Adequacy, 66 STAN. L. REV. 477, 516–21 
(2014) (summarizing the history of equity and adequacy litigation). 
 19. William E. Thro, To Render Them Safe: The Analysis of State Constitutional Provisions in 
Public School Finance Reform Litigation, 75 VA. L. REV. 1639, 1661–70 (1989) (detailing states’ 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol94/iss2/7
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majority of state courts have held that these constitutional clauses include 
an equity or quality component that obligates the state to do more than just 
offer minimal basic services.
20
 To ensure adequate education opportunity, 
states must create funding formulas that supply additional funds to meet 
the needs of disadvantaged students and, among other things, ensure 
access to quality teachers.
21
 While this litigation has not come close to 
curing all of education’s funding and quality ills, courts have emphasized 
that states’ affirmative duties in education are not optional, even during 
times of financial exigency.
22
 
The recession appears to have changed the trajectory of equity and 
adequacy litigation. Since the recession, courts have rejected school 
funding and quality challenges at a far higher rate.
23
 Even in those 
instances in which plaintiffs have won since the recession, legislatures 
have simply defied the courts, refusing to comply with judicial remedies.
24
 
Thus, even when plaintiffs have received favorable judicial opinions, they 
have struggled to secure victory outside court.  
This legislative resistance also raises concerns that stretch well beyond 
education rights to the basic legitimacy of judicial decisionmaking itself. If 
legislatures will defy courts in the education context, defiance in other 
contexts only becomes more likely. Whether these trends will change in 
the other education cases currently pending in the courts remains to be 
seen.
25
 But unless courts reengage and alter their approach soon, increased 
 
 
constitutional clauses regarding education). See infra note 162 for a full explanation of how the 
number of constitutions supporting education has vacillated between 49 and 50. 
 20. Michael A. Rebell, Poverty, “Meaningful” Educational Opportunity, and the Necessary Role 
of the Courts, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1467, 1500–05 (2007) (discussing plaintiff victories in school funding 
litigation). 
 21. See, e.g., Rose v. Council for Better Educ., 790 S.W.2d 186, 219 (Ky. 1989) (Wintersheimer, 
J., concurring); Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359, 403 (N.J. 1990); Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. 
State, 801 N.E.2d 326, 348 (N.Y. 2003) (“[I]nputs should be calibrated to student need and hence that 
state aid should increase where need is high and local ability to pay is low.”). 
 22. See, e.g., Butt v. State, 842 P.2d 1240, 1243 (Cal. 1992); Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 208; 
Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor, 794 A.2d 744, 754 (N.H. 2002); Abbott v. Burke, 798 A.2d 602, 
603–04 (N.J. 2002); Campbell Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. State, 907 P.2d 1238, 1279 (Wyo. 1995). 
 23. See infra notes 169–220. 
 24. See, e.g., John Eligon, Courts Budget Intensifies Kansas Dispute Over Powers, N.Y. TIMES 
(June 6, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/07/us/courts-budget-intensifies-kansas-dispute-over-
powers.html; Kirk Johnson, Washington State Faces $100,000-a-Day Fine Until Schools Plan Is 
Reached, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 13, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/14/us/washington-state-
faces-dollar100000-a-day-fine-until-schools-plan-is-reached.html. 
 25. See, e.g., Conn. Coal. Just. Educ. Funding v. Rell, No. X07-HHD-CV-14-5037565-S (Conn. 
Super. Ct. filed Jan. 22, 2014); Martinez v. State, No. D-101-CV-2014-00793 (N.M. Dist. Ct. filed 
Nov. 14, 2014); Maisto v. State, No. 8997-08 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. filed Nov. 6, 2008); William Penn Sch. 
Dist. V. Pennsylvania, No. 46-MAP-2015 (Pa. Sup. Ct. filed May 20, 2015); Hamilton Cty. Bd. of 
Educ. v. Haslam, No. 15-1048-III (Tenn. Ch. Ct. filed Mar. 24, 2015). 
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inequality and inadequacy may become the new norm—a norm that courts 
and advocates have spent decades trying to unseat.
26
  
An erosion of judicial enforcement raises two fundamental questions 
about the current state of constitutional education rights and duties. First, 
are education rights and duties contingent on external competing factors? 
As a matter of doctrine, courts prior to the recession have emphatically 
said no.
27
 Even after the recession, none have dared suggest otherwise, 
rejecting plaintiffs’ claims on other questionable grounds.28 But if the real 
measure of a constitutional right is its enforcement rather than its mere 
doctrinal articulation,
29
 education rights are being quickly devalued and 
becoming, as a practical matter, entirely contingent on external factors. In 
effect, courts are granting states the power to override education rights, 
without even demanding that states justify their policies. 
This devaluing of education rights leads to the second question: can 
future overrides of education rights be avoided or minimized? Aggressive 
judicial intervention at the moment of serious educational crisis is too little 
too late. Even in good times, motivating legislatures to pass remedial 
legislation can be challenging.
30
 During economic crises, legislatures only 
grow more recalcitrant and might ignore the court.
31
 The practical effect of 
legislative defiance is to undermine the legitimacy of the judiciary itself, 
as judicial authority primarily depends on voluntary compliance. 
Similarly, the constitutional importance of education duties and rights 
 
 
 26. See Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Destabilization Rights: How Public Law 
Litigation Succeeds, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1016 (2004) (arguing that the primary role of school finance 
litigation has been to destabilize the status quo and earn outsiders a role in the policymaking process); 
Jill Barshay, The Gap Between Rich and Poor Schools Grew 44 Percent Over a Decade, HECHINGER 
REP. (Apr. 6, 2015), http://hechingerreport.org/the-gap-between-rich-and-poor-schools-grew-44-percent-
over-a-decade/ (finding a new expansion of inequality). 
 27. See, e.g., Butt, 842 P.2d at1243; Claremont Sch. Dist., 794 A.2d at 754; Abbott, 798 A.2d at 
603–04. 
 28. See, e.g., Dwyer v. State, 357 P.3d 185 (Colo. 2015) (analyzing state’s failure to increase 
education funding at the rate of inflation per a constitutional amendment, but upholding decreased 
funding on technical grounds). 
 29. See Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 
857, 904 (1999) (“[A] right without a remedy is worthless”); see also Julia A. Simon-Kerr & Robynn 
K. Sturm, Justiciability and the Role of Courts in Adequacy Litigation: Preserving the Constitutional 
Right to Education, 6 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 83, 87 (2010) (“[T]he state constitutional right to education 
is in danger of being rendered meaningless”). 
 30. See generally Laura Kalman, Law, Politics, and the New Deal(s), 108 YALE L.J. 2165 (1999) 
(analyzing the battle between the judiciary and Congress and the President over the New Deal). 
 31. William S. Koski, Of Fuzzy Standards and Institutional Constraints: A Re-Examination of 
the Jurisprudential History of Educational Finance Reform Litigation, 43 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 
1185, 1190 (2003) (characterizing contempt as a symbolic statement in school funding litigation); see 
also Michael Heise, Litigated Learning and the Limits of Law, 57 VAND. L. REV. 2417, 2420 (2004) 
(questioning the capacity of courts to force positive education reform). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol94/iss2/7
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rests on the existence of a judiciary that can enforce them. Operating 
within these practical constraints, the only effective means of ensuring 
constitutional compliance in education during crisis is to prepare for crisis 
before it occurs.  
Toward that end, this Article proposes three steps to alleviate the 
potential further devaluation of education rights in the future. First, 
moving forward, court orders in school equity and adequacy cases must 
deter future constitutional violations. In the past, courts have asked no 
more of states than that they create constitutional systems at some point 
following the litigation. States have never been asked to repair the damage 
done to students who suffered from inadequate educational opportunity.
32
 
Thus, as a practical matter, states face no consequences for violations and 
are incentivized to repeat them when expedient. Courts must, where 
appropriate, hold states accountable for the harm they cause. The lack of 
past accountability all but invited states to cut education spending during 
the recession and maintain those cuts until forced to act otherwise. 
Second, to deter future violations, courts must be more clear in 
identifying state actions that violate state constitutions. Past decisions have 
been far too meandering in their analysis of violations.
33
 Even conceding 
that the complexity and ambiguity in measuring educational opportunity 
will always require some circumstantial analysis, certain bright line rules 
can mark the outer limits of constitutionally acceptable policy.
34
 These 
bright line rules could then be used in the future to ward off new 
constitutional violations. Otherwise, states do not know they have violated 
their education duty—and have no reason to act differently—until a court 
specifically orders them to do so. Worse still, some states may exploit 
doctrinal ambiguities in the pursuit of ulterior agendas. 
Third, courts must prompt states to improve the structure of their 
education decisionmaking process and planning. Education budgets must 
be primarily driven by expert assessments of actual student need, not 
 
 
 32. See Scott R. Bauries, A Common Law Constitutionalism for the Right to Education, 48 GA. 
L. REV. 949, 986–87, 999–1006 (2014) (characterizing school finance decisions as legislative holdings 
and pointing out that school funding remedies do not actually address the individual fact-based harms 
that students suffer and advocating a shift). See also James S. Liebman, Desegregating Politics: “All-
Out” School Desegregation Explained, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1463, 1513–17 (1990) (citing as a 
fundamental flaw in desegregation that court orders did nothing to address the harms that previously 
segregated students suffered). 
 33. See James E. Ryan, Standards, Testing, and School Finance Litigation, 86 TEX. L. REV. 
1223, 1232–38 (2008) (concluding that neither adequacy nor equity neatly capture the analytical 
frameworks of past decisions). 
 34. See, e.g., Abbott v. Burke, 693 A.2d 417, 439 (N.J. 1997) (mandating that per-pupil funding 
in plaintiffs’ districts be no less than in affluent suburban districts). 
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political deal-making and random variations in available funds.
35
 Also, 
because future economic downturns are inevitable, the continuing duty to 
consistently meet student need must include current plans that prepare for 
future contingencies. While courts lack the power to formally alter the 
legislative process, they do possess the power to identify those facts and 
considerations that are important in the process and afford presumptive 
weight to particular types of evidence. Clear signals in this respect could 
move legislatures to voluntarily make changes to their processes.  
None of these steps ensures that that the next educational crisis will be 
entirely averted, but they do reduce the likelihood of rights devaluation. In 
best-case scenarios, the deterrence value of earlier decisions and the 
structures they prompted will make it less likely that courts are drawn into 
an intractable dispute during an economic crisis in the first place. States 
will be incentivized to resolve crises through better educational planning 
and decisionmaking, not through high-stakes and uncertain litigation 
before a state supreme court. In worst-case scenarios, courts will be called 
upon to enforce clear doctrine articulated years earlier. Any remedy a 
court may order will be one a state and its citizens could have reasonably 
anticipated. Applying clear, existing doctrine rather than vague concepts to 
nuanced facts would offer courts a defense against assertions that they are 
making policy and reinforce the notion that courts are acting objectively, 
both of which should increase the likelihood of legislative compliance. In 
short, a proactive approach puts courts in the best position to enforce 
education rights during crisis and reduces the possibility that courts will 
unjustifiably ignore and sanction gross retractions of the sort seen in this 
past recession. 
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I explores the details of the 
current crisis, identifying exactly how much money schools have lost, 
whether those cuts were necessary, and the practical impacts of those cuts 
on student achievement, educational quality, and teachers. Part II explores 
the judicial refusal to intervene in constitutional education disputes during 
and after the recession, concluding that this shift in the enforcement marks 
a troubling new era in which the right to education is being significantly 
devalued. Part II also explores: (a) why courts have disengaged, 
(b) whether the right to education is contingent, and (c) what analysis 
courts should have offered during and after the recession. It concludes 
 
 
 35. See Montoy v. State, 138 P.3d 755, 764 (Kan. 2006) (requiring “an equitable and fair 
distribution of the funding to provide an opportunity for every student to obtain a suitable education”); 
Abbott v. Burke, 971 A.2d 989, 1000–01 (N.J. 2009) (analyzing the extent to which the state’s funding 
formula was calibrated, consistent with expert analysis, to meet student need).  
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that, based on available evidence, many of the education cuts imposed in 
recent years likely violate state constitutions. Part III acknowledges the 
difficulty in preventing education rights retraction during crisis and 
develops three strategies by which courts might reengage and avoid 
repeating past mistakes. 
I. THE CURRENT CRISIS 
Over the past decade, public education has reached the point of crisis, 
much of which is the result of intentional state and federal action. States 
enacted massive funding cuts to education budgets and services during the 
2008 recession. The funding cuts reached levels that would, based on 
social science research, have substantial negative effects on student 
achievement.
36
 Those funding cuts, along with statutory changes to teacher 
tenure, evaluation, rights, and pay, destabilized the teaching profession. As 
a result, access to teachers—regardless of quality—steadily shrunk during 
the recession. While state revenues have rebounded, education budgets 
and the teaching profession have not. Education budgets are low and 
states’ efforts to improve them are minimal. The little teacher hiring that 
has occurred shows that prospective and existing teachers have fled the 
profession in response to a so-called war on teachers. In the fall of 2015, 
classes across the nation started with, at best, uncertified fill-in teachers 
and, at worst, no teacher at all. The same problem occurred again in the 
fall of 2016.
37
 The longer these patterns persist, the more likely it will be 
that this generation of students will face insurmountable learning deficits. 
The recession may have made some level of cuts unavoidable, but the 
extent of the cuts and their continuing effects are a result of active policy 
decisions. At the same time states were defunding public education and 
imposing new requirements on teachers, they were more than doubling 
funding for charters and vouchers and making a more favorable policy 
climate for them. Traditional public schools were characterized as a failing 
and inefficient paradigm. Charters and vouchers were touted as the 
solution. That these educational alternatives have been readily funded 
during a time when traditional public schools are asked to make enormous 
 
 
 36. Compare Jackson et al., supra note 15, at 5 (finding that 20% increases in funding can close 
two-thirds of the achievement gap and 10% increases have proportional effects) with MICHAEL 
LEACHMAN & CHRIS MAI, MOST STATES STILL FUNDING SCHOOLS LESS THAN BEFORE THE 
RECESSION, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES 4 (Oct. 16, 2014), http://www.cbpp.org/sites/ 
default/files/atoms/files/10-16-14sfp.pdf (finding continuing funding cuts in excess of 10% in 14 
states). See also EDUC. TR., supra note 17. 
 37. Darling-Hammond et al., supra note 1. 
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sacrifices raises serious questions about states’ commitment to public 
schools and whether the recession just offered an excuse to make cuts that 
were not entirely necessary. The fact that funding for public education has 
not rebounded following the recession, even in states running budget 
surpluses, makes this explanation all the more plausible.  
A. Defunded Public Schools  
According to the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities—a 
nonpartisan research and policy institute—“[s]tates are providing less per-
pupil funding for kindergarten through 12th grade than they did seven 
years ago—often far less.”38 In 2014, thirty states were spending less per 
pupil than they were before the recession and, in fourteen states, the 
decrease was substantial.
39
 Oklahoma, for instance, is spending almost 
25% less now than in 2008.
40
 Most states are doing something to address 
the problem, but their efforts are modest.
41
 In other words, funding levels 
remain well below pre-recession levels by choice, not because states lack 
the money. By 2012, all but two states had total gross domestic products 
that met or exceeded 2008 levels,
42
 but only eighteen states increased their 
effort to fund education.
43
 States are simply allocating funds to non-
education projects or refusing to exert tax effort.  
The ten states making the biggest cuts in education following the 
recession continue to rank in the bottom half of the nation in terms of 
effort exerted to fund education.
44
 The Education Law Center’s School 
Funding Fairness Report ranked the funding effort in five of those ten 
states as an “F.”45 Some states even continue to decrease their effort as tax 
revenues improve.
46
 North Carolina may be the worst offender. It cut its 
education budget by 15% and gave massive new tax cuts to the state’s 
highest income earners.
47
 Inexplicably, the state has maintained those 
 
 
 38. LEACHMAN & MAI, supra note 36, at 1. 
 39. Id. (fourteen states cut per-student funding by more than 10%). 
 40. Id. at 12. 
 41. Id. 
 42. BAKER ET AL., supra note 4, at 20. 
 43. Id. at 21. 
 44. Compare LEACHMAN & MAI, supra note 36, at 12 tbl.2 with BAKER ET AL., supra note 4, at 
19 fig.18. 
 45. BAKER ET AL., supra note 4, at 25 tbl.1. 
 46. Id. at 21 fig.19. 
 47. LEACHMAN & MAI, supra note 36, at 2; Patrick Gleason, North Carolina Lawmakers Build 
upon Historic Tax Reform, FORBES (June 10, 2015), http://www.forbes.com/sites/patrickgleason/2015/ 
06/10/nc-taxreform/#26d8a32d2bf0; see also MICHAEL LEACHMAN & MICHAEL MAZEROV, STATE 
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education cuts despite a nearly half-billion dollar surplus in tax receipts in 
2015.
48
  
Making matters worse, state budget cuts have been felt unevenly across 
school districts. Alabama, for instance, enacted the second largest cuts to 
education of any state.
49
 But even before the cuts, districts serving large 
numbers of poor and at-risk students were already operating at a serious 
disadvantage. In Alabama, districts with the highest-need student 
populations receive 10% less in state funding than districts serving more 
advantaged students.
50
 In Nevada, the difference is unconscionable. In 
2012, Nevada districts with the neediest student populations received only 
half the funding of more advantaged districts.
51
 Georgia, however, may 
have been the most ruthless in targeting cuts during the recession. In 2010, 
the state recommended $112 million in funding cuts to programs 
specifically designed to assist low-income districts.
52
 Based on the most 
recent data, only twelve states fund districts serving predominantly poor 
students at the same or higher level than districts serving predominantly 
middle-income students.
53
 
At the local level, massive cuts coupled with inequitable funding 
practices have driven some districts to the brink of catastrophe. Budget 
cuts in Pennsylvania caused shortfalls so steep in Philadelphia that the 
 
 
PERSONAL INCOME TAX CUTS: STILL A POOR STRATEGY FOR ECONOMIC GROWTH, CTR. ON BUDGET 
& POL’Y PRIORITIES 3 (May 14, 2015), http://www.cbpp.org/research/state-budget-and-tax/state-
personal-income-tax-cuts-still-a-poor-strategy-for-economic (characterizing NC as one of the biggest 
tax cutting states in the nation during the past five years). 
 48. Press Release, N.C. Office of the Governor, Governor McCrory Praises $445 Million 
Revenue Surplus (July 28, 2015), https://governor.nc.gov/press-release/governor-mccrory-praises-445-
million-revenue-surplus.  
 49. LEACHMAN & MAI, supra note 36, at 2 fig.1. 
 50. BAKER ET AL., supra note 4, at 36 tbl.B-2. 
 51. Id. 
 52. NICHOLAS JOHNSON ET AL., CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES, AN UPDATE ON STATE 
BUDGET CUTS: GOVERNORS PROPOSING NEW ROUND OF CUTS FOR 2011: AT LEAST 46 STATES HAVE 
ALREADY IMPOSED CUTS THAT HURT VULNERABLE RESIDENTS AND CAUSE JOB LOSS 11 (2010), 
http://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/3-13-08sfp.pdf; Memorandum from Jeffery C. 
Welch et al., Consortium for Adequate Sch. Funding in Georgia, to Donna Hinton (Jan. 29, 2009) 
(showing a $112 million cut to equalization grants, which amounted to a 20% cut of those funds 
designed to help lower-wealth districts), https://eboard.eboardsolutions.com/Meetings/Attachment. 
aspx?S=4172&AID=170553. See also Michael A. Rebell, Safeguarding the Right to a Sound Basic 
Education in Times of Fiscal Constraint, 75 ALB. L. REV. 1855, 1859–60 (2012) (describing cuts in 
pre-kindergarten, advanced placement, and other programs that disproportionally affected low-income 
students). 
 53. NATASHA USHOMIRSKY & DAVID WILLIAMS, EDUC. TR., FUNDING GAPS 2015: TOO MANY 
STATES STILL SPEND LESS ON EDUCATING STUDENTS WHO NEED THE MOST 5 (2015) (after 
accounting for student need). 
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district began eliminating basic services and closing schools.
54
 The 
situation became bad enough that national civil rights leaders descended 
on the state in protest, concluding that “Pennsylvania has become a 
national model of dysfunction in education.”55  
Two years later, the crisis has not ended. Pennsylvania public schools 
began the 2015 academic year without a state budget.
56
 Halfway through 
the school year, the state still had no budget.
57
 As a result, wealthier 
school districts were forced to draw on reserves, to operate solely on local 
funding, and to borrow money.
58
 Poor districts asked teachers to work 
without pay and contemplated closing altogether.
59
 Many indicated that 
pre-kindergarten programs and entire schools would have to close soon.
60
 
National observers labeled events like those in Pennsylvania, North 
Carolina, and elsewhere as nothing less than a war on public education.
61
  
 
 
 54. Derek Black, The Perfect Storm Undermining Philadelphia’s Schools, EDUC. L. PROF. BLOG 
(Oct. 15, 2013), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/education_law/2013/10/the-perfect-storm-undermining-
philadelphias-schools.html; SHARON WARD, PENN. BUDGET & POL’Y CTR., A STRONG STATE 
COMMITMENT TO PUBLIC EDUCATION, A MUST HAVE FOR PENNSYLVANIA’S CHILDREN 5 (Apr. 2014), 
http://pennbpc.org/sites/pennbpc.org/files/20140429schoolreport.pdf (estimating budget cuts to be 
35% in Philadelphia). 
 55. Joy Resmovits, Tom Corbett Pressured by Civil Rights Groups on Philadelphia School 
Funding, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 11, 2013) (quoting Wade Henderson, President of the Leadership 
Conference on Civil and Human Rights), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/10/11/tom-corbett-
philadelphia-schools_n_4080350.html. 
 56. Mareesa Nicosia, The Tenuous Fate of Pennsylvania’s Public Schools, THE ATLANTIC (Oct. 
13, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2015/10/pennsylvania-budget-legislature-
school-funding/409936/. 
 57. Daarel Burnette II, In Setback for Hurting Districts, Pa. House GOP Ditches Plan to End 
Budget Impasse, EDUC. WK. (Dec. 7, 2015), http://blogs.edweek.org/edweek/state_edwatch/2015/12/ 
in_setback_for_hurting_districts_pa_house_gop_ditches_plan_to_end_budget_impasse.html. 
 58. PENN. SCH. BD. ASS’N, THE FINANCIAL IMPACT OF THE BUDGET IMPASSE ON 
PENNSYLVANIA SCHOOL DISTRICTS 1 (Feb. 2016), https://www.psba.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/ 
Budget-survey-results-FINAL-02082016.pdf. 
 59. Burnette, supra note 57; Chester-Upland Teachers Agree to Work Without Pay, ABC 
ACTION NEWS (Aug. 28, 2015), http://6abc.com/education/chester-upland-teachers-agree-to-work-
without-pay/960004/.  
 60. AP, Pre-K Programs May Close Due to Pennsylvania Budget Battle, READING EAGLE (Oct. 
26, 2015), http://www.readingeagle.com/news/article/pre-k-programs-may-close-due-to-pennsylvania-
budget-battle&template=mobileart; Nicosia, supra note 56; Denisa R. Superville, Some Penn. Districts 
May Not Open After Christmas Due to State Budget Impasse, EDUC. WK. (Dec. 10, 2015), 
http://blogs.edweek.org/edweek/District_Dossier/2015/12/two_pennsylvania_districts_may.html; Kyle 
Wind, Carbondale Schools Could Shut Down over PA Budget Impasse, THE TIMES-TRIBUNE (Sept. 
25, 2015), http://thetimes-tribune.com/news/carbondale-schools-could-shut-down-over-pa-budget-impasse-
1.1947881. 
 61. Valerie Strauss, North Carolina’s Step-by-Step War on Public Education, WASH. POST (Aug. 
7, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/answer-sheet/wp/2015/08/07/north-carolinas-step-
by-step-war-on-public-education/. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol94/iss2/7
p 423 Black book pages 2/3/2017  
 
 
 
 
 
2016] AVERTING EDUCATIONAL CRISIS 435 
 
 
 
 
B. The Diversion of Education Funds and Policy 
1. Charter Schools 
While traditional public education has struggled before and after the 
recession, charter schools, which are run by private groups with public 
money, have not.
62
 State and federal funding for charters has flourished 
over the past decade. In many instances, the financial shortfalls in public 
school districts are directly related to the expansion and funding of 
charters. States made it far easier for charters to open and imposed 
substantial portions of charter school operating costs on local districts. To 
be clear, charter schools are relatively few in number compared to 
traditional public schools and, thus, are far easier to fund. But the fact that 
their funding has increased while public school funding has decreased 
calls states’ commitment to traditional public education into question.  
North Carolina and Pennsylvania, again, provide two of the most 
poignant examples of the diverging trajectory of charters and traditional 
public schools. Immediately before the recession, North Carolina spent 
$169 million on charter schools.
63
 By the 2014–2015 school year, the state 
had more than doubled its commitment to charters, spending $366 million 
a year.
64
 In Pennsylvania, not only has the state incentivized charters and 
increased its financial commitment to them, the state has forced school 
districts to transfer a portion of their funds to local charters.
65
 This transfer 
of funds has been a critical component of the funding struggles of high 
poverty districts like Philadelphia and Chester. By 2012, the Chester 
school district owed the local charter schools $43 million—almost half of 
 
 
 62. All but a few states have passed statutes governing the creation and operation of charter 
schools. Those states invite non-governmental entities to file applications with the state, asking for 
authority and funding to run schools. In many ways, charter schools are similar to public schools. They 
are publicly funded, open to all, and free to attend. As a general matter, however, they operate outside 
of states’ normal bureaucratic structures, such as school boards and superintendents. Instead, they 
operate based on the charter or contract they sign with the state. For a more detailed description of 
charter schools, see Derek W. Black, Charter Schools, Vouchers, and the Public Good, 48 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 445 (2013).  
 63. N.C. DEP’T OF PUB. INSTRUCTION, HIGHLIGHTS OF THE NORTH CAROLINA PUBLIC SCHOOL 
BUDGET 29 (Feb. 2013), http://www.ncpublicschools.org/docs/fbs/resources/data/highlights/2013 
highlights.pdf. 
 64. N.C. DEP’T OF PUB. INSTRUCTION, HIGHLIGHTS OF THE NORTH CAROLINA PUBLIC SCHOOL 
BUDGET 30 (Feb. 2015), http://www.ncpublicschools.org/docs/fbs/resources/data/highlights/2015 
highlights.pdf. Funding for charters went up every year of the recession and recovery except one. Id.  
 65. Chester Upland Sch. Dist. v. Pennsylvania, 284 F.R.D. 305, 314 (E.D. Pa. 2012) (state law 
required district to pay charters $9,800 for each regular education student and $24,000 for each special 
education student).  
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Chester’s entire school budget.66 Similarly, Philadelphia’s school district 
operated at a $70 million deficit between 2008 and 2013, but the city’s 
charter schools ran a surplus of $117 million.
67
 North Carolina and 
Pennsylvania, however, are not alone. Several states have increased per-
pupil allotments for charter schools and specifically took the funds for 
those increases from the budget for traditional public schools.
68
  
Some of the blame for this divergent trajectory lies with federal policy. 
Through money and substantive policy, the federal government has 
promoted, if not forced, the expansion of charters.
69
 First, it has drastically 
increased charter school funding for two consecutive decades,70 including 
during the recession when federal charter funding grew by 18.8%.
71
 In his 
2016 budget, the President called for another 50% increase in charter 
funding over the prior year—an increase that members of both parties 
supported.
72
  
 
 
 66. Id.; see also PA’s Chester-Upland School District Reaches Settlement in School Funding 
Lawsuit, ACCESS (2016), http://schoolfunding.info/2012/09/pas-chester-upland-school-district-reaches-
settlement-in-school-funding-lawsuit/. 
 67. CITY OF PHILA. PA. OFFICE OF THE CONTROLLER, THE IMPACT OF CHARTER SCHOOLS ON 
THE FINANCES OF THE SCHOOL DISTRICT OF PHILADELPHIA 3 (Oct. 2014), http://www.philadelphia 
controller.org/publications/CharterSchool_FinancialImpact_October2014.pdf. 
 68. See Tiara Beatty, Indiana Increases Funding for Charter Schools, Creates New Loan 
Program, EDUC. WK. (July 8, 2015), http://blogs.edweek.org/edweek/charterschoice/2015/07/ 
indiana_increases_funding_for_charter_schools_despite_past_debt.html; Confusing Formula for Ohio 
Charter School Funding, IDEASTREAM (Nov. 25, 2015), http://wcpn.ideastream.org/news/confusing-
funding-formula-ohio-charter-schools-0; Final NJ Budget: Charter and Private Schools Get More, No 
Increase for District Schools, EDUC. LAW CTR. (July 6, 2015), http://www.edlawcenter.org/ news/ 
archives/school-funding/final-nj-budget-charter-and-private-schools-get-more-no-increase-for-district-
schools.html; Howard Fischer, Arizona Panel Crafting Changes to School Funding System, ARIZ. 
DAILY STAR (Sept. 22, 2015), http://m.tucson.com/news/local/education/arizona-panel-crafting-changes-
to-school-funding-system/article_dc8abda4-1605-563f-8408-d16effdadc85.html?mobile_touch=true; 
Timothy J. Shrom, Solanco Sch. Dist., Pennsylvania Spending Patterns: A Comparison of Charter 
Schools and School District Spending by Share of Selected Functions, Presentation at the National 
Education Finance Conference in Louisville, Kentucky (Apr. 2014), http://www.solanco sd.org/wp-
content/uploads/2014/04/Spending-Patterns-Charter-and-School-District-Comparison.pdf; Jacqueline 
Rabe Thomas, Deal on Charter-School Conflict: More Funding All Around, CTMIRROR (June 1, 2015), 
https://ctmirror.org/2015/06/01/deal-on-charter-school-conflict-more-funding-all-around/; Ben Wood, 
Utah School Districts Eyeing Tax Increases to Cover Charter School Funding Costs, SALT LAKE 
TRIBUNE (June 9, 2015), http://www.sltrib.com/home/2606861-155/utah-school-districts-eyeing-tax-
increases.  
 69. Jonas Persson, New Documents Show How Taxpayer Money Is Wasted by Charter Schools—
Stringent Controls Urgently Needed as Charter Funding Faces Huge Increase, PR WATCH (May 8, 
2015), http://www.prwatch.org/files/5-8-15_final_cmd_reporters_guide_on_charter_waste_and_lack_ 
of_accountability.pdf.  
 70. Erica Frankenberg & Genevieve Siegel-Hawley, Choosing Diversity: School Choice and 
Racial Integration in the Age of Obama, 6 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 219, 244 (2010) (discussing specific 
federal budget increases for charter schools and their comparison to other programs).  
  71. Persson, supra note 69, at app. 1 (from $175 million in 2008 to $208 million in 2013). 
 72. Melissa Korn & Caroline Porter, Obama’s Proposed Budget Seeks More for Education, 
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Second, U.S. Secretary of Education, Arne Duncan, aggressively used 
his administrative power to ensure pro-charter policies at the state level. 
Most notably, he conditioned states’ ability to obtain competitive grants on 
their willingness to expand charter schools. Speaking of Race to the Top 
Program grants, Secretary Duncan cautioned that states that “put artificial 
caps on the growth of charter schools will jeopardize their [grant] 
applications.”73 Desperate to secure much-needed education resources 
during the recession, many states that had long resisted charter schools 
saw no choice but to lift caps and more freely grant charters.
74
 
Third, notwithstanding major increases in charter funding and 
administrative mandates, Congress continues to push for more of them. 
Despite the fact that 80% of traditional public schools were facing 
sanctions under the No Child Left Behind Act,
75
 the single piece of new 
education legislation the House of Representatives managed to move 
forward during the recession was on charter schools.
76
 Five years later, 
most of the ideas in that bill became part of the Every Student Succeeds 
Act, which included no meaningful new money for traditional public 
schools but did include substantial new incentives for charter schools.
77
 
The net result of Congress, the Administration, and states’ actions is 
impressive by any measure. Charter schools grew throughout the 
recession, notwithstanding the retraction of almost every other government 
and private sector in the country. Between 2007 and 2012, the number of 
charter schools in operation grew from 4,388 to more than 6,000—a nearly 
40% increase.
78
 The number of students enrolled in charters grew even 
more, nearly doubling to 2.26 million.
79
 In short, while funding and 
 
 
WALL ST. J. (Feb. 2, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/obamas-proposed-budget-seeks-more-for-
education-1422898651. 
 73. David Nagel, Charter School Support Is a Prerequisite for Race to the Top Funds, JOURNAL 
(June 9, 2009), http://thejournal.com/articles/2009/06/09/charter-school-support-is-a-prerequisite-for-
race-to-the-top-funds.aspx. 
 74. Derek W. Black, Civil Rights, Charter Schools, and Lessons to Be Learned, 64 FLA. L. REV. 
1723, 1725 (2012); Erik W. Robelen, State Picture on Charter Caps Still Mixed, EDUC. WK. (Aug. 3, 
2009), http://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2009/08/03/37charter.h28.html.  
 75. See generally Sam Dillon, Overriding a Key Education Law, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 8, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/08/education/08educ.html?_r=0 (predicting that the number of 
failing schools would reach 80,000 out of 100,000 in 2011). 
 76. Sam Dillon, With Bipartisan Support, Law on Expansion of Charter Schools Passes the 
House, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 13, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/14/education/14educ.html. 
 77. Every Student Succeeds Act, Pub. L. 114-95, § 4301, 129 Stat. 1802 (2015). 
 78. NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, DIGEST OF EDUCATION STATISTICS 204 (2014), 
http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2016/2016006.pdf. 
 79. Id. at 205 (from 1.27 million charter school students to 2.26 million). 
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general legislative support for traditional public schools has withered, 
funding and favorable policies for charter schools have flourished. 
2. Vouchers 
State support for vouchers also took off during the recession. This 
growth is particularly significant because voucher support had been tepid 
at best for the decade leading up to the recession.
80
 The growth was due in 
part to a change in rationale. Previously, vouchers were touted as a tool for 
disadvantaged students to escape failing schools and exercise the choice 
options that others have.
81
 Consistent with that mission, states imposed 
income eligibility caps.
82
 More recently, however, states have raised or 
eliminated those income caps, making vouchers available to the middle-
class as well.
83
  
Florida was the first state to make this substantive shift. At the same 
time funds for public education were falling, the state altered and 
expanded its voucher program. At the outset of the recession, the state 
spent $87 million on vouchers.
84
 By 2014, the state had all but eliminated 
income eligibility caps and drastically increased the amount it would fund 
per voucher.
85
 The result was a quadrupling of voucher spending to $344 
million.
86
  
Other states followed a similar trajectory, exponentially increasing 
voucher funds and eliminating or raising income eligibility caps. But some 
took their support one step further, using regular public education funds to 
finance the agenda. Wisconsin, for instance, cut public education funding 
by nearly 15%
87
 during the same time that it decided to offer vouchers 
 
 
 80. See generally James Forman, Jr., The Rise and Fall of School Vouchers: A Story of Religion, 
Race, and Politics, 54 UCLA L. REV. 547 (2007).  
 81. Id. 
 82. See, e.g., Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 646 (2002); Jackson v. Benson, 578 
N.W.2d 602, 617 (Wis. 1998). 
 83. See, e.g., Derek Black, Voucher Movement Finally Coming Clean? New Push Is All About 
Middle Income Students, EDUC. LAW PROF BLOG (July 31, 2015), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/ 
education_law/2015/07/voucher-movement-finally-coming-clean-new-push-is-all-about-middle-income-
students.html [https://perma.cc/UBN7-9BML]. 
 84. FLA. DEP’T EDUC., CORPORATE TAX CREDIT SCHOLARSHIP PROGRAM: JUNE QUARTERLY 
REPORT (2009), https://www.stepupforstudents.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/ctc-stats-09-06.pdf. 
 85. FLA. DEP’T EDUC., FLORIDA TAX CREDIT SCHOLARSHIP PROGRAM (Nov. 2015), 
http://www.fldoe.org/core/fileparse.php/5606/urlt/FTC_Nov_2015.pdf. 
 86. Id. 
 87. LEACHMAN & MAI, supra note 36, at 2 fig.1. 
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statewide and to a higher income group of families.
88
 In 2015, the increase 
for vouchers came out of school district budgets.
89
 Indiana, however, may 
be the worst offender, reducing its funding effort for public schools
90
 and 
enacting the most expansive voucher program in our nation’s history.91 
Within four years, student enrollment in the program grew by 
approximately 600% and the state’s investment by more than 700%.92  
Again, this growth is in stark contrast to the experience of traditional 
public schools over the past decade. 
C. The Educational Impacts of Funding Cuts 
The significance of the foregoing cuts and shifts in funding policy are 
enormous. Social science research demonstrates that funding levels affect 
student achievement. Funding cuts of the size experienced over the course 
of the past eight years easily rise to a level that can depress academic 
outcomes. Teachers, likewise, matter enormously in the quality of 
education students receive. In fact, studies consistently cite teachers as the 
most significant variable in student achievement.
93
 Unfortunately, budget 
cuts hit teachers hard, shrinking their ranks and dis-incentivizing college 
students—the next generation of teachers—from pursuing education 
careers. Students are now learning in larger classrooms and from less-
qualified teachers, who are too often just substitute teachers, interns, and 
others who lack full teaching credentials. Together, the funding and 
teacher deficits suffered during and after the recession imposed harms that 
cannot easily be undone. States thus far have shown little interest in even 
 
 
 88. Patti Zarling, 10 Things to Know About Private School Vouchers, GREEN BAY PRESS 
GAZETTE (AUG. 1, 2015), http://www.greenbaypressgazette.com/story/news/education/2015/08/01/ 
things-know-private-school-vouchers/30983793/. 
 89. See TAMARINE CORNELIUS & JON PEACOCK, WISCONSIN BUDGET PROJECT, AN OVERVIEW 
OF EDUCATION ISSUES IN THE 2013–15 BUDGET (July 2, 2013), http://www.wisconsinbudgetproject. 
org/how-the-amended-2013-15-wisconsin-budget-affects-k-12-education. North Carolina similarly 
doubled the size of its voucher program while cutting regular education. Complaint at 9, Hart v. State, 
No. 13CV016771 (N.C. Super. Ct. Dec. 11, 2013), http://www.ncjustice.org/sites/default/files/ 
VoucherComplaint.pdf.  
 90. BAKER ET AL., supra note 4, at 21. 
 91. Michelle Ye Hee Lee, Mike Pence’s Claim That Indiana Has the Largest School Voucher 
Program, WASH. POST (Aug. 12, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-checker/wp/ 
2016/08/12/mike-pences-claim-that-indiana-has-the-largest-school-voucher-program/. 
 92. INDIANA DEP’T OF EDUC., CHOICE SCHOLARSHIP PROGRAM ANNUAL REPORT: 
PARTICIPATION AND PAYMENT DATA 7, 26–27 (Apr. 2016), http://www.doe.in.gov/sites/default/files/ 
news/2015-2016-choice- scholarship-program-report-final-april2016.pdf. 
 93. Derek W. Black, Taking Teacher Quality Seriously, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1597, 1607–09 
(2016) (surveying and referencing the studies on the effects of quality teachers on student outcomes). 
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attempting a reversal. The following subparts explore each of these points 
in full. 
1. Money Matters 
Whether funding inequalities mattered was heavily contested in the 
1970s and 1980s, but over the past two decades research firmly establishes 
that it does matter. The overwhelming percentage of studies demonstrate a 
positive relationship between school funding and student outcomes.
94
 
Summarizing the literature in 1996, Rob Greenwald wrote that per-pupil 
expenditures “show strong and consistent relations with achievement . . . . 
In addition, resource variables that attempt to describe the quality of 
teachers (teacher ability, teacher education, and teacher experience) show 
very strong relations with student achievement.”95 The specific effect of 
spending may differ depending on how funds are allocated, but “a broad 
range of resources were positively related to student outcomes, with effect 
sizes large enough to suggest that moderate increases in spending may be 
associated with significant increases in achievement.”96 Eighteen years 
later, in 2012, Bruce Baker reviewed more recent studies and found that 
the research consensus remained the same.
97
 
Given the nature of achievement gaps and funding inequities, the more 
important question may be how money affects disadvantaged students in 
particular. Examining more than three decades of data, Kirabo Jackson and 
her colleagues found that a 20% increase in per-pupil funding, if 
maintained over the course of a students’ education career, results in low-
income students completing almost a full additional year’s worth of 
education.
98
 That additional learning eliminates two-thirds of the gap in 
outcomes between low- and middle-income students.
99
 They also found 
 
 
 94. Rob Greenwald et al., The Effect of School Resources on Student Achievement, 66 REV. 
EDUC. RES. 361, 362, 368 (1996) (finding a broad range of school inputs are positively related to 
student outcomes, and that the magnitude of the effects are sufficiently large to suggest that moderate 
increases in spending may be associated with significant increases in achievement).  
 95. Id. at 384. 
 96. Id. at 361. See also ULRICH BOSER, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, RETURN ON EDUCATIONAL 
INVESTMENT: 2014 (July 2014), https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/ROI-
report.pdf (assessing the extent to which schools spend money in ways that improve achievement). 
 97. BAKER, supra note 14, at 6 (New studies “have invariably found a positive, statistically 
significant (though at times small) relationship between student achievement gains and financial 
inputs.”). 
 98. Jackson et al., supra note 15, at 5. 
 99. Id. at 44. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol94/iss2/7
p 423 Black book pages 2/3/2017  
 
 
 
 
 
2016] AVERTING EDUCATIONAL CRISIS 441 
 
 
 
 
proportionally positive outcomes based on just 10% increases in funding 
across time.
100
  
As the various data and reports spelled out above detail, nearly a third 
of the states are funding schools state-wide at levels 10% below where 
they were in 2008.
101
 Even assuming that funding levels in all or most 
states were at least minimally adequate in 2008—which is a huge 
assumption—these widespread cuts are causing real damage. These cuts 
have been in place for nearly a decade and were much larger a few years 
ago. This is to say nothing of even deeper and more damaging cuts in 
particular districts with high need and regressive state funding formulas. 
2. Teachers Matter Most 
Money matters, first of all, because roughly 80% of state and local 
education budgets are spent on teachers.
102
 The effect of teachers on 
student outcomes, unlike other education policies, is not in question. 
Voluminous social science findings confirm that teacher quality is the 
most important school resource affecting student achievement.
103
 The 
National Commission on Teaching and America’s Future summarized the 
research this way: “1) What teachers know and can do is the most 
important influence on what students learn[;] 2) Recruiting, preparing, and 
retaining good teachers is the central strategy for improving our schools[;] 
and 3) School reform cannot succeed unless it focuses on creating the 
conditions in which teachers can teach, and teach well.”104  
 
 
 100. C. Kirabo Jackson et al., Boosting Educational Attainment and Adult Earnings, 15 EDUC. 
NEXT 69, 72 (2015), http://educationnext.org/boosting-education-attainment-adult-earnings-school-
spending/. Smaller scale studies of individual states have reached similar conclusions. Michael A. 
Rebell & Bruce D. Baker, Assessing “Success” in School Finance Litigations, EDUC. WK. (July 8, 
2009), http://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2009/07/08/36rebell.h28.html. 
 101. LEACHMAN & MAI, supra note 36, at 1. 
 102. See, e.g., Wyoming v. Campbell Cty. Sch. Dist., 19 P.3d 518 (Wyo. 2001); NAT’L CTR. FOR 
EDUC. STATISTICS, THE CONDITION OF EDUCATION: PUBLIC SCHOOL EXPENDITURES (2015), 
http://nces.ed.gov/programs/coe/indicator_cmb.asp. 
 103. See generally Linda Darling-Hammond, Teacher Quality and Student Achievement: A 
Review of State Policy Evidence, 8 EDUC. POL’Y ANALYSIS ARCHIVES 1 (2000) (finding teacher 
quality to be strongly related to student achievement); Steven G. Rivkin et al., Teachers, Schools, and 
Academic Achievement, 73 ECONOMETRICA 417 (2005); S. Paul Wright et al., Teachers and 
Classroom Context Effects on Student Achievement: Implications for Teacher Evaluation, 11 J. 
PERSONNEL EVAL. EDUC. 57 (1997). 
 104. NAT’L COMM’N ON TEACHING & AMERICA’S FUTURE, WHAT MATTERS MOST: TEACHING 
FOR AMERICA’S FUTURE 10 (1996), http://nctaf.org/wp-content/uploads/WhatMattersMost.pdf.  
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Consistent exposure to low- or high-quality teaching over the course of 
years also has a compounding effect for individual students.
105
 One 
prominent study found that “having a top-quartile teacher rather than a 
bottom-quartile teacher four years in a row would be enough to close the 
black-white test score gap.”106 Another found that elementary students 
assigned to high-performing teachers for three straight years will achieve 
fifty percentile points higher on standardized tests than students assigned 
to low-performing teachers.
107
 The sad reality, however, is that students 
attending predominantly poor and minority schools are assigned to novice, 
unqualified, and “out-of-field” teachers at twice the rate of students in low 
poverty schools and predominantly white schools.
108
 As the following 
parts demonstrate, recent funding cuts have made access to teachers, much 
less quality teachers, extremely challenging for many schools.   
 
 
 105. DANIEL F. MCCAFFREY ET AL., CARNEGIE CORP., RAND EDUCATION, EVALUATING VALUE-
ADDED MODELS FOR TEACHER ACCOUNTABILITY (2003), http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/ 
pubs/monographs/2004/RAND_MG158.pdf; John F. Kain, The Impact of Individual Teachers and 
Peers on Individual Student Achievement, Paper Presented at the Association for Public Policy 
Analysis and Management 20th Annual Research Conference, New York (Oct. 31, 1998); Robert L. 
Mendro et al., An Application of Multiple Linear Regression in Determining Longitudinal Teacher 
Effectiveness, Paper Presented at the 1998 Annual Meeting of the AERA California (Apr. 1998). 
 106. ROBERT GORDON ET AL., THE HAMILTON PROJECT, THE BROOKINGS INST., IDENTIFYING 
EFFECTIVE TEACHERS USING PERFORMANCE ON THE JOB 8 (2006), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2016/06/200604hamilton_1.pdf.  
 107. WILLIAM L. SANDERS & JUNE C. RIVERS, CUMULATIVE AND RESIDUAL EFFECTS OF 
TEACHERS ON FUTURE STUDENT ACADEMIC ACHIEVEMENT 3, 6–7 (1996), http://www.cgp.upenn.edu/ 
pdf/Sanders_Rivers-TVASS_teacher%20effects.pdf. See also Eric A. Hanushek, Valuing Teachers: 
How Much Is a Good Teacher Worth?, 11 EDUC. NEXT 41, 43 (2011); ROBIN CHAIT, CTR. AM. 
PROGRESS, REMOVING CHRONICALLY INEFFECTIVE TEACHERS: BARRIERS AND OPPORTUNITIES 2 
(2010), https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/issues/2010/03/pdf/teacher_dismissal.pdf 
(“[D]ismissing the bottom quartile of novice teachers in the district after their first year based on 
value-added estimates would result in a net increase in student test score gains of 1.2 percentage points 
annually across the district.”). 
 108. Charles T. Clotfelter et al., High-Poverty Schools and the Distribution of Teachers and 
Principals, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1345 (2007); HEATHER G. PESKE & KATI HAYCOCK, EDUC. TR., 
TEACHING INEQUALITY: HOW POOR AND MINORITY STUDENTS ARE SHORTCHANGED ON TEACHER 
QUALITY 2–3 (2006), http://edtrust.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/TQReportJune2006.pdf. But see 
Eric Isenberg et al., Do Low-Income Students Have Equal Access to Effective Teachers? Evidence 
from 26 Districts (Oct. 2016) (finding that minimal differences in the effectiveness of low-income 
students’ teachers versus other students’ teachers), file:///C:/Users/blackdw/Downloads/Access% 
20to%20Effective%20Teachers%20fnlrpt.pdf. The Isenberg study, however, relies on value-added 
metrics, which have been subject to strong criticisms of unreliability. See Black, supra note 5, at 94–
102 (articulating and explaining the flaws of value-added and student growth percentile evaluation 
systems). 
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3. Widespread Teacher Shortages 
Between 2009 and 2012, states reduced their teaching staffs by about 
300,000.
109
 In the first year, 37% of school districts planned to cut teachers 
in core subjects, with that number growing to 61% the next year.
110
 The 
Los Angeles Unified School District, the second largest school district in 
the nation, shrunk its teaching force by 15% in three years.
111
 The 
economy and state tax revenues have steadily improved since then, but 
education jobs have been slow to return—slower, in fact, than any other 
post-recession period of the past fifty years.
112
 In 2015, there were still 
236,000 fewer education jobs than there were before the recession.
113
 
When measured against student growth, the numbers are even worse. The 
most recent estimates indicate a 410,000 shortfall in teaching and 
education jobs.
114
  
The irony is that now that teaching jobs are slowly coming back, 
districts cannot fill them. Since the recession, senior and prospective 
teachers have increasingly fled the profession all together. After hiring a 
meager forty thousand new teachers nationwide in 2014,
115
 districts 
apparently exhausted the labor pool. When school started in 2015, schools 
across the nation found themselves unable to fill their vacancies.
116
 
California, for instance, needed to fill 21,500 teaching positions in 2015, 
but issued credentials to fewer than 15,000 prospective teachers.
117
 Las 
Vegas needs to hire more than 2,500 teachers a year, but the entire state of 
Nevada is only producing about 750 new teachers a year.
118
 
 
 
 109. Barbara Martinez, Teacher Seniority Rules Challenged, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 19, 2010), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748703315004575073561669221720 (indicating 60,000 
school employees were laid off in 2009 alone); Travis Waldron, Local Governments Have Cut 130,000 
Teaching Jobs in the Last Year, THINK PROGRESS (July 6, 2012), https://thinkprogress.org/chart-local-
governments-have-cut-130-000-teaching-jobs-in-the-last-year-eb5c1e67f8c3#.b4x01rent; INVESTING 
IN OUR FUTURE, supra note 5. 
 110. ELLERSON, supra note 2, at 14. 
 111. Dan Goldhaber et al., Lessons Learned from the Great Recession: Layoffs and the RIF-
Induced Teacher Shuffle 41 tbl.1 (Nat’l Ctr. for Analysis of Longitudinal Data in Educ. Res., Working 
Paper No. 129, July 2015), http://www.caldercenter.org/sites/default/files/WP%20129.pdf. 
 112. Id. at 4. 
 113. Elise Gould, Disappointing Jobs Numbers and Not Enough Teachers, EPI: WORKING ECON. 
BLOG (Oct. 2, 2015), http://www.epi.org/blog/disappointing-jobs-numbers-and-not-enough-teachers/. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id.  
 116. See, e.g., Eger & Habib, supra note 6 (indicating that Tulsa started the year with 150 teaching 
and 100 support position vacancies and that 856 public school classes in Oklahoma were completely 
cancelled due to lack of teachers). 
 117. Rich, supra note 1. 
 118. Anthony Rebora, Faced With Deep Teacher Shortages, Clark County, Nev., District Looks 
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Shortages of this magnitude are creating intense competition between 
and within states. This competition is amplifying the shortages in less 
competitive states and districts, pushing them further into staffing deficits. 
Missouri, for instance, raided Kansas of 4,000 teachers this past year—a 
70% jump from recent years.
119
 Texas and Arkansas are similarly raiding 
teachers from districts along the Oklahoma border.
120
 North Carolina, once 
a great place for teachers, has seen the rate of departure to other states 
jump by 30%.
121
  
4. Lowering Teacher Quality 
The effect on particular districts in these and other states is even 
greater. Less desirable districts have been forced to cancel classes, 
combine classes, or just staff them with any warm body available. Doing 
so conflicts with any number of state laws and has required these districts 
to seek wide-scale exemptions from state teaching standards. In more 
practical terms, this crisis just added insult to injury, driving down teacher 
quality even further in districts that have long struggled to hire and retain 
highly qualified teachers.
122
 
This past fall, for instance, Oklahoma drastically increased the number 
of emergency exemptions from the basic education and training standards 
normally required before a teacher enters the classroom.
123
 Kansas went 
even further and waived teacher license requirements for entire school 
districts.
124
 Superintendents in those districts are now relying on substitute 
 
 
for Answers, EDUC. WK. (Jan. 25, 2016), http://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2016/01/27/faced-with-
deep-teacher-shortages-clark-county.html. 
 119. Katie Ferrell, Kansas Teacher Shortage Expected to Get Worse if Funding Issues Aren’t 
Resolved, FOX4KC (Aug. 3, 2015), http://fox4kc.com/2015/08/03/kansas-teacher-shortage-expected-to-
get-worse-if-funding-issues-arent-resolved/; AP, Teacher Shortages Spur Districts Nationwide to Try 
New Tactics, CBS NEWS (Aug. 12, 2015), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/teacher-shortages-spur-
districts-nationwide-to-try-new-tactics/. 
 120. Eger & Habib, supra note 6. 
 121. Arika Herron, More Teachers Leaving for Other Districts, Other States, Other Jobs, 
WINSTON-SALEM J. (Oct. 1, 2015), http://www.journalnow.com/news/local/more-teachers-leaving-for-
other-districts-other-states-other-jobs/article_3c7e326a-4b4e-5709-945f-8890280a61b0.html. 
 122. Charles T. Clotfelter et al., Who Teaches Whom?: Race and the Distribution of Novice 
Teachers, 24 ECON. OF EDUCATION REV. 377–392 (2005); ERICA FRANKENBERG, THE CIVIL RIGHTS 
PROJECT AT HARVARD UNIV., THE SEGREGATION OF AMERICAN TEACHERS 25–26 (2006), 
http://www.racialequitytools.org/resourcefiles/frankenberg.pdf. 
 123. Eger & Habib, supra note 6 (in a month and a half, the Oklahoma Department of Education 
received 526 requests for exemptions).  
 124. Coburn Palmer, New Kansas Education Law Opens Classrooms to Unlicensed Teachers, 
State Faces Major Teacher Shortage, INQUISITR (July 17, 2015), http://www.inquisitr.com/2261038/ 
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teachers as primary instructors.
125
 California is similarly issuing more 
emergency permits,
126
 but has adopted a separate, much larger, program 
that formalizes the practice of putting previously uncertified individuals in 
the classroom. The state is placing interested individuals directly into the 
classroom as “interns,” while they take teacher preparation courses during 
nights and weekends.
127
 In 2013–14, these interns made up 20% of the 
individuals to whom the state granted teaching credentials.
128
  
These noncredentialed teachers are also entering larger classrooms 
now. Layoffs during the recessions drove up average class sizes.
129
 The 
combination of growth in student population and current teacher shortages 
are keeping class sizes bigger. Between 2000 and 2008, the national 
average for class size steadily dropped, but those gains were completely 
wiped away in just two years of the recession.
130
 Since then, the national 
average class size has remained flat, as teacher hiring has been unable to 
offset increases in student enrollment.
131
 And as suggested above, the 
shortages are not felt evenly. Class sizes have risen dramatically in less 
desirable states and districts.
132
  
The problem of shortages, lower teacher credentials, and bigger class 
sizes may get even worse in the coming years. The number of students 
pursuing careers in education has sharply decreased over the past decade. 
From 2010 to 2014, California experienced a 55% drop in the number of 
students pursuing and completing education degrees.
133
 Indiana 
 
 
new-kansas-education-law-opens-classrooms-to-unlicensed-teachers-state-faces-major-teacher-shortage/ 
(granting six districts an exemption). 
 125. Klein, supra note 7. 
 126. Rich, supra note 1 (“[T]he number of emergency temporary permits issued to allow 
noncredentialed staff members to fill teaching posts jumped by more than 36 percent from 2012 to 
2013.”). 
 127. Id.; SUCKOW & PURDUE, supra note 5, at 5. 
 128. SUCKOW & PURDUE, supra note 5, at 1 (marking 2013–14 as the tenth straight year of 
decline in teacher certificates). 
 129. INVESTING IN OUR FUTURE, supra note 5, at 2. 
 130. Id. 
 131. NAT’L EDUC. ASS’N, RANKINGS & ESTIMATES: RANKINGS OF THE STATES 2013 AND 
ESTIMATES OF SCHOOL STATISTICS 2014 71–75 (2014), http://www.nea.org/assets/docs/NEA-
Rankings-and-Estimates-2013-2014.pdf. 
 132. Eger & Habib, supra note 6; Klein, supra note 7; KAN. CTR. FOR ECON. GROWTH, QUALITY 
AT RISK: IMPACT OF EDUCATION CUTS 3–4 (Sept. 2014), http://realprosperityks.com/wp-
content/uploads/2014/09/KCEG-school-funding-report3.pdf (indicating that Kansas currently has 
19,000 more students than it did at the beginning of the recession, but 655 fewer teachers); Rebell, 
supra note 52, at 1858 (“[A]verage class sizes in Los Angeles have bumped up toward thirty and were 
over forty in some high schools.”). 
 133. TITLE II HIGHER EDUCATION ACT, supra note 9; SUCKOW & PURDUE, supra note 5, at 17 
(from 44,692 in 2008 to 19,933 in 2012).  
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experienced similarly drastic drops.
134
 U.S. Department of Education data 
reveals that these states are not alone. The number of people pursuing 
education degrees nationally has dropped 30%.
135
 Thus far, these trends 
have proven immune to market demand.
136
  
5. Unmet Student Need 
Larger classes with fewer qualified teachers are also arising at the same 
time that student need is increasing.
137
 Between 2001 and 2011, the South 
saw a 33% growth in poor students, the West 31%, the Midwest 40% and 
the Northeast 21%.
138
 By 2013, low-income students had become the 
majority in our nation’s public schools.139 In several states, low-income 
students are approaching or have become a super-majority.
140
  
This growth in poverty also coincided with an increase in poverty 
concentration and racial segregation in particular schools. At the beginning 
of the recession, one in five low-income students attended a school whose 
overall student population was at least 30% poor.
141
 By 2012, that number 
jumped to more than one in three.
142
 At the other end of the spectrum, the 
percent of low-income students attending predominantly middle income 
schools shrunk considerably.
143
 Similar trends in increased racial isolation 
occurred as well.
144
 The average African-American or Latino student 
 
 
 134. In Indiana, Ball State University has experienced a 45% enrollment drop in elementary and 
kindergarten teacher-preparation, and the state a “63[%] drop in first-time teaching licenses issued by 
the state over a five-year stretch beginning in 2009.” Jeff Wiehe, Teacher Shortage Worries Schools, 
JOURNAL GAZETTE (July 19, 2015), http://www.journalgazette.net/news/local/Teachershortageworries 
schools-7766086. 
 135. TITLE II HIGHER EDUCATION ACT, supra note 9. 
 136. See, e.g., SUCKOW & PURDUE, supra note 5; Darling-Hammond, Sutcher, & Carver-Thomas, 
supra note 1 (finding the 2015 teacher crisis was repeating itself in 2016). 
 137. See, e.g., CHRIS DUNCOMBE & MICHAEL CASSIDY, THE COMMONWEALTH INST., MISSING 
CLASS 1 (Nov. 2015), http://www.thecommonwealthinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/ 
missing_class_v4_FINAL.pdf (“Taking into account growing student enrollment, Virginia’s schools 
are missing over 11,000 positions, including 4,200 teachers” and “the number of economically 
disadvantaged students has risen by 39 percent.”). 
 138. S. EDUC. FOUND., A NEW MAJORITY: LOW INCOME STUDENTS IN THE SOUTH AND NATION 7 
(2013), http://www.southerneducation.org/getattachment/817a35f1-abb9-4d6a-8c2e-5514d4a6d7d9/ 
Test-Publication-4.aspx. 
 139. Id. at 5–6. 
 140. Id. 
 141. BAKER ET AL., supra note 4, at 5. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. 
 144. GARY ORFIELD & ERICA FRANKENBERG, THE CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT, BROWN AT 60: GREAT 
PROGRESS, A LONG RETREAT AND AN UNCERTAIN FUTURE 10 (2014), https://civilrightsproject.ucla. 
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attended a school that was predominantly minority, whereas the average 
White student attended a school that was 72.5% white.
145
 In short, less 
qualified teachers are not only being asked to teach more students; they are 
being asked to teach in environments with far more student need. 
D. A War on Public Education and Teachers? 
Many see the foregoing school finance cuts and their effects on 
teachers as an attack on public education and teachers themselves.
146
 The 
divergent trends in funding between traditional public education and 
alternatives to traditional public education in the form of charters and 
vouchers add credence to these suspicions.
147
 But money only tells part of 
the story. Educational policies to control and sanction traditional public 
schools have flourished over the past decade and a half, while the strings 
attached to charters and vouchers are minimal.
148
 The result is a rhetoric of 
failing and inherently flawed traditional public schools on the one hand 
and high achieving charter schools and vouchers on the other.
149
 Actual 
data, however, shows that similarly situated students in charters perform 
no better than students in traditional public schools.
150
 To the contrary, 
more often they perform worse.
151
 Students attending private schools on 
vouchers do not perform decidedly better either.
152
 
 
 
edu/research/k-12-education/integration-and-diversity/brown-at-60-great-progress-a-long-retreat-and-
an-uncertain-future/Brown-at-60-051814.pdf. 
 145. Id. at 12. 
 146. See, e.g., DIANE RAVITCH, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF THE GREAT AMERICAN SCHOOL 
SYSTEM: HOW TESTING AND CHOICE ARE UNDERMINING EDUCATION (2010); Strauss, supra note 61; 
Danny Feingold, Robert Reich: Elites Are Waging War on Public Education, SALON, June 18, 2015, 
http://www.salon.com/2015/06/18/robert_reich_elites_are_waging_war_on_public_education_partner. 
 147. See infra notes 38–92. 
 148. See generally Kelly Smith, Minnesota School Districts Begged; Now They Borrow, MINN. 
STAR. TRIB. (Nov. 30, 2011), http://www.startribune.com/minnesota-school-districts-begged-now-
they-borrow/134799543/ (indicating that state was holding onto 40% of the education funding until the 
following year, which would impose huge borrowing costs on districts). 
 149. See generally JOHN E. CHUBB & TERRY M. MOE, POLITICS, MARKETS, AND AMERICA’S 
SCHOOLS 3 (1990). 
 150. NAT’L ASSESSMENT OF EDUC. PROGRESS, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., THE NATION’S REPORT 
CARD: AMERICA’S CHARTER SCHOOLS—RESULTS FROM THE NAEP 2003 PILOT STUDY 1, 7 (2004), 
http://nces.ed.gov/nationsreportcard/pdf/studies/2005456.pdf; Erik W. Robelen, NAEP Gap 
Continuing for Charters, 27 EDUC. WK. 1 (2008), http://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2008/05/21/  
38charter_ep.h27.html. 
 151. NAT’L ASSESSMENT OF EDUC. PROGRESS, supra note 150, at 1, 10. 
 152. Christopher Lubienski & Peter Weitzel, The Effects of Vouchers and Private Schools in 
Improving Academic Achievement: A Critique of Advocacy Research, 2008 BYU L. REV. 447, 448 
(2008). 
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The attack on teachers has been even more direct in recent years.
153
 As 
tax revenues fell, some state governments saw an opportunity to scale 
back teachers’ salaries and exercise their political influence in ways that 
were previously unacceptable. States made significant changes to teachers’ 
collective bargaining agreements, their relationships with teacher unions, 
salary structures, and overall teacher benefits, giving teachers nothing in 
return.
154
 In some states, political leaders pitted teachers as the enemy of 
the public good during a time of financial crisis.
155
  
States also took steps to substantively change the teaching profession 
itself. States began using students’ standardized achievement scores to 
evaluate individual teacher effectiveness.
156
 These evaluations then 
became the basis for making personnel decisions, including tenure, 
compensation, and termination.
157
 Advocates in some states sought to go 
even further and eliminate tenure altogether,
158
 which would leave 
teachers with almost no protection against discharge when their students 
performed poorly.  
If these evaluation systems were reliable, teachers might have willingly 
accepted them. But too many factors go into student learning, and the tests 
for assessing that learning are too imprecise to reliably identify the effects 
 
 
 153. See, e.g., Valerie Strauss, The War on Teachers: Why the Public Is Watching It Happen, 
WASH. POST (Mar. 12, 2012), https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/answer-sheet/post/the-war-on-
teachers-why-the-public-is-watching-it-happen/2012/03/11/gIQAD3XH6R_blog.htmlhttps://www. 
washingtonpost.com/blogs/answer-sheet/post/the-war-on-teachers-why-the-public-is-watching-it-
happen/2012/03/11/gIQAD3XH6R_blog.html.  
 154. See, e.g., Madison Teachers Inc. v. Walker, 851 N.W.2d 337 (Wis. 2014) (litigation over 
legislative changes to collective bargaining rights); NAT’L COUNCIL ON TEACHER QUALITY, THE 
RECESSION’S IMPACT ON TEACHER SALARIES 1 (2013), http://www.nctq.org/dmsView/The_ 
Recessions_Impact_On_Teacher_Salaries_NCTQ_Report (finding 80% of districts enacted “a total 
pay freeze or pay cut in at least one of the school years between 2008–09 and 2011–12” and 95% froze 
or cut previously automatic cost of living and experience based raises); Deborah R. Gerhardt, Pay Our 
Teachers or Lose Your Job, SLATE (Jan. 5, 2014), http://www.slate.com/articles/life/education/ 
2014/01/north_carolina_s_assault_on_teachers_has_to_stop.html. 
 155. Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt & Winston Lin, The Great Recession, the Resulting Budget 
Shortfalls, the 2010 Elections and the Attack on Public Sector Collective Bargaining in the United 
States, 29 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 407 (2012); David A. Gamson, The Dismal Toll of the War on 
Teachers, NEWSWEEK (Oct. 5, 2015), http://www.newsweek.com/dismal-toll-war-teachers-379951.  
 156. See Benjamin M. Superfine, New Directions in School Funding and Governance: Moving 
from Politics to Evidence, 98 KY. L.J. 653, 665 (2010). 
 157. Id.   
 158. Vergara v. State, No. BC484642, 2014 WL 6478415 (Cal. Sup. Ct. Aug. 27, 2014); N.C. 
Ass’n of Educators, Inc. v. State, 776 S.E.2d 1 (N.C. Ct. App. 2015) cert. granted, 775 S.E.2d 831 
(N.C. 2015) (reversing statute that eliminated tenure and teachers’ other statutory protections); Al 
Baker, Lawsuit Challenges New York’s Teacher Tenure Law, N.Y. TIMES (July 3, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/04/nyregion/lawsuit-contests-new-yorks-teacher-tenure-laws.html?_ 
r=0; Haley Sweetland Edwards, The War on Teacher Tenure, TIME (Oct. 30, 2014), http://time.com/ 
3533556/the-war-on-teacher-tenure/. 
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of individual teachers on student outcomes.
159
 Evidence shows that teacher 
effectiveness ratings can inexplicably vary by large margins from year to 
year and test to test,
160
 so much so that a teacher could be recognized as 
outstanding one year only to be labeled underperforming the next year.
161
  
In short, states have asked teachers to do more with less: more students, 
higher expectations, more accountability, and a lower salary with less 
security. In addition, teachers’ jobs seemingly hang in the balance of 
students’ tests scores and courts’ willingness to intervene. During this 
policy shift, teachers’ job satisfaction has steadily decreased, reaching an 
all-time low in recent years
162
 and prompting many to quit the profession 
altogether.
163
 The actual experience of teachers indicates that the 
profession has become undesirable, if not inhospitable, in certain respects. 
Thus, it is no surprise that as states begin to hire new teachers there are far 
too few people willing to accept the offer. 
II. CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF EDUCATIONAL CRISIS 
Were education like any other public service, the drastic retraction 
during the recession and meager rebound afterward might be acceptable. 
But education is distinct from any other government activity. All fifty state 
constitutions specifically obligate the state to provide education for its 
citizens.
164
 The simple operation of schools, however, is not enough. 
 
 
 159. Black, supra note 5 at 95. 
 160. Eva L. Baker et al., Problems with the Use of Student Test Scores to Evaluate Teachers 2 
(Econ. Pol’y Inst. Briefing Paper No. 278, 2, 2010). 
 161. See, e.g., Houston Fed’n of Teachers v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 4:2014cv01189 (S.D. 
Tex. Apr. 30, 2014) (recounting the experience of a plaintiff teacher in the district who had previously 
received an award for excellent teaching). 
 162. The 2012 MetLife Survey of Teachers found that teacher job satisfaction declined from 62% 
in 2008 to 39% by 2012, the lowest in the 25-year history of the survey. METLIFE, INC.,THE METLIFE 
SURVEY OF THE AMERICAN TEACHER 45 (2012) https://www.metlife.com/assets/cao/foundation/ 
MetLife-Teacher-Survey-2012.pdf. 
 163. Overall teacher attrition has been relatively high for some time and has remained relatively 
flat over the last decade, but there was a significant change among senior teachers who began exiting 
at a significantly higher rate. Matthew Di Carlo, Update on Teacher Turnover in the US, ALBERT 
SHANKER INST. (Jan. 22, 2015), http://www.shankerinstitute.org/blog/update-teacher-turnover-us 
(from 27.8 % to 38.3%).  
 164.  Thro, supra note 19, at 1661 (indicating forty-nine states have a constitutional education 
duty). The number of state constitutions imposing an education duty or right has shifted between forty-
nine and fifty over the past several decades. The shift is attributable to Mississippi. The Mississippi 
Constitution of 1890 included an education clause, but that clause was erased from the constitution in 
1960 in response to Brown v. Board of Education. Hon. Michael P. Mills, William Quin, II, The Right 
to a “Minimally Adequate Education” As Guaranteed by the Mississippi Constitution, 61 ALB. L. REV. 
1521, 1525–26 (1998); see also T.H. Freeland, III et al., Seeking Educational Funding Equity in 
Mississippi: “I Asked for Water, You Gave Me Gasoline”, 58 MISS. L.J. 247, 258–59 (1988). In 1987, 
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Many of those state constitutions specifically describe education as the 
state’s foremost obligation.165 Others describe the education to be 
delivered as high quality, efficient, or thorough to prepare students for 
their future roles as citizens and competitors in the work place.
166
 The 
legislative histories behind those constitutional clauses are equally strong 
in setting high expectations and state duties in education.
167
  
On the strength of these clauses and their histories, state supreme 
courts in a majority of the states have forced state legislatures to improve 
school funding, teacher quality, teacher salaries, and general educational 
opportunity.
168
 In a number of states, supreme courts have done so 
repeatedly over a course of years.
169
 To be clear, some state courts have 
refused to enforce these education clauses, but their reluctance stems from 
questions of judicial authority and manageable standards for enforcing the 
rights, not some sense that a constitutional duty on the part of the state is 
missing or that students do not have a right to education.
170
 
These education clauses and the past judicial enforcement of them raise 
the question of how education funding, teacher quality, access to teachers, 
and class sizes could retract so far during and after the recession without 
judicial intervention. Do courts lack the institutional power and courage to 
intervene in education during times of financial crisis? Did some flaw in 
precedent prior to the recession create the conditions for current failures? 
Or, worst of all, are states’ education duties contingent in certain respects? 
If the answer to any of these questions is yes, constitutional education 
rights and duties are far weaker than previously theorized by scholars and 
articulated by courts. This weakness would also signal the need for new 
 
 
Mississippi amended its constitution to once again include what appeared to be an education duty. 
MISS. CONST. art. VIII, § 201 (“The Legislature shall, by general law, provide for the establishment, 
maintenance and support of free public schools upon such conditions and limitations as the Legislature 
may prescribe.”). That change brought the total states under an education duty back to fifty. 
 165. See, e.g., GA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1, para. I (“The provision of an adequate public education 
for the citizens shall be a primary obligation of the State of Georgia.”); FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 1 
(“paramount duty of the state” to provide adequate education); Nev. Const. art XII, Sec. 6 (requiring 
education to be funded before any other programs are funded). 
 166. Thro, supra note 19, at 1663 n.111. 
 167. INST. FOR EDUC. EQUITY & OPPORTUNITY, EDUCATION IN THE 50 STATES: A DESKBOOK OF 
THE HISTORY OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS AND LAWS ABOUT EDUCATION (2008), http://www.pilcop. 
org/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/EDU_50State.pdf (detailing the history of each state’s education 
clause). 
 168. Rebell, supra note 20, at 1500–05. 
 169. Id. 
 170. See id. at 1485–86 (when states have won these cases it has been “because of either 
(1) separation of powers principles that hold that these issues should be determined exclusively by the 
legislative and executive branches, and not by the courts; or (2) the tradition of local control of 
education.”). 
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doctrinal developments to prevent further retraction and the devolution of 
education rights and duties into nothing more than political questions. At 
that point, judicial intervention would, even in good times, place the 
legitimacy of judicial decision making even further into question. 
The following parts take up these questions and problems. Part II.A 
surveys school funding litigation outcomes during and after the recession, 
finding that courts have taken a far more pro-defendant approach than they 
had in the past. Given the egregious facts described above, this stance 
suggests a growing willingness to tolerate constitutional violations during 
economic crisis. Part II.B addresses whether education rights are 
contingent and, if not, whether they may still be subject to certain limits. 
Based on that analysis, Part II.C theorizes why education duties and rights 
have been under-enforced in recent years. 
A. Judicial Reticence  
In the two decades prior to the recession, state supreme courts 
consistently affirmed adequacy and equity challenges to state education 
systems. By Michael Rebell’s count, plaintiffs succeeded more than 60% 
of the time prior to 2008.
171
 The post-recession data set is much smaller, 
but between 2008 and 2012, plaintiffs lost about two-thirds of the time in 
high courts.
172
 Equally troubling is that, notwithstanding the end of the 
recession, the trend has not substantially improved since 2012. Although 
only time will tell, the recession potentially triggered a new long-term 
norm. If so, constitutional education rights and duties in some states could 
be functionally irrelevant.  
Since the recession, plaintiffs have suffered complete or substantial 
losses before the highest courts in six states.
173
 They have won complete 
 
 
 171. Id. at 1500. 
 172. This calculation excludes initial holdings that plaintiffs can survive a motion to dismiss. The 
early procedural wins have turned into substantive losses later in some states. Compare Lobato v. 
State, 218 P.3d 358 (Colo. 2009) (en banc) (overturning lower court decision that had dismissed 
plaintiffs’ claims as non-justiciable) with Lobato v. State, 304 P.3d 1132, 1144 (Colo. 2013) (holding 
that on the merits “the current public school financing system complies with the Education and Local 
Control Clauses of the Colorado Constitution”). 
 173. Dwyer v. State, 357 P.3d 185 (Colo. 2015); Lobato v. State, 304 P.3d 1132, 1144 (Colo. 
2013); Bonner v. Daniels, 907 N.E.2d 516, 522 (Ind. 2009); Abbott v. Burke, 20 A.3d 1018 (N.J. 
2011); Davis v. State, 804 N.W.2d 618 (S.D. 2011); Woonsocket Sch. Comm. v. Chafee, 89 A.3d 778, 
793–94 (R.I. 2014); Morath v. Texas Taxpayer & Student Fairness Coal., 490 S.W.3d 826 (Tex. 
2016). As discussed, infra, New Jersey reasonably could have been counted as a victory. The result in 
the case was mixed. South Carolina’s result was similarly mixed, with an initial finding of a 
constitutional deprivation but a later finding that the state’s minimal attention to the issue was 
sufficient. . Compare Abbeville Cty. Sch. Dist. v. State, 767 S.E.2d 157, 161 (S.C. 2014) with 
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victories in only two states and a nominal victory in a third.
174
 The mere 
occurrence of losing does not necessarily signal a shift. After all, state 
wins could be attributable to states making appropriate improvements in 
education after earlier losses. The facts and substance of the recent 
decisions, however, suggests otherwise. For instance, Rhode Island and 
South Dakota’s supreme courts acknowledged their states’ affirmative 
duty to meet student need and deliver quality education opportunities, as 
well as compelling evidence that the states may have failed in those 
respects.
175
 In fact, South Dakota was amongst the nation’s worst in terms 
of education funding cuts between 2008 and 2015 and was next to last in 
terms of funding effort.
176
 Yet, both courts rejected plaintiffs’ claims. The 
Rhode Island Supreme Court simply indicated that these concerns should 
be directed to some other branch of government.
177
 The South Dakota 
Supreme Court applied an unusually high burden of proof and indicated 
that it was “unable to conclude that the education funding system . . . fails 
to correlate to actual costs or with adequate student achievement”178 
enough to declare the system unconstitutional. The Indiana Supreme Court 
was the third to outright reject plaintiffs’ claims and did not even reach the 
facts, concluding that state education clause does “not . . . create a 
constitutional right to be educated to a certain quality or other output 
standard.”179 
The two other losses, however, may be more significant because they 
represent, in effect, a direct reversal of education rights. One of those 
losses was in Colorado and came as a surprise given the positive support 
education claims had previously received in the state. Most notably, in 
 
 
Abbeville Cty. Sch. Dist. v. State, Case No. 2007-06519, Order (Sept. 20, 2016). This article counts 
South Carolina as a nominal victory. Regardless of how one counts these cases, the overall trend in 
school finance cases remains the same: negative. Although not discussed above the line, it is also 
worth noting that plaintiffs in Arizona also unquestionably saw their longstanding string of finance 
wins come to an end and future possibilities cut off. See, e.g., Horne v. Flores, 129 S. Ct. 2579 (2009); 
Flores v. Huppenthal, 789 F.3d 994, 997–98 (9th Cir. 2015). But that litigation, while relying in part 
on state theories, has been litigated based on a federal statute. 
 174. Gannon v. State, 319 P.3d 1196 (Kan. 2014); McCleary v. State, 269 P.3d 227 (Wash. 2012); 
Abbeville Cty. Sch. Dist. v. State, 767 S.E.2d 157, 161 (2014). This count does not include procedural 
victories, as they later turned into losses on the merits in some states. 
 175. Davis, 804 N.W.2d at 641 (recognizing “struggle[s] to provide adequate facilities and 
qualified teachers,” and “serious questions about whether the state aid formula is based on actual 
costs”); Woonsocket, 89 A.3d at 793–94 (claims and evidence of inadequate “funding required to meet 
state mandates.”). 
 176. BRUCE BAKER ET AL., IS SCHOOL FUNDING FAIR?: A NATIONAL REPORT CARD 22 (2d ed. 
2012); BAKER ET AL., supra note 3, at 27; LEACHMAN & MAI, supra note 36, at 2. 
 177. Woonsocket, 89 A.3d at 793–94. 
 178. Davis, 804 N.W.2d at 641. 
 179. Bonner, 907 N.E.2d at 522. 
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2009, the Colorado Supreme Court had held that an adequacy challenge 
was justiciable and could move forward to trial.
180
 Plaintiffs then 
presented extensive evidence of inequalities and won at trial. The trial 
record revealed that rather than providing “qualified teachers, up-to-date 
textbooks, access to modern technology, and safe and healthy facilities in 
which to learn,” the Colorado “education system . . . is fundamentally 
broken[,] plagued by underfunding and marked by gross funding 
disparities among districts.”181  
In 2013, notwithstanding strong evidence and its prior decision, the 
Colorado Supreme Court reversed the lower court and ruled against the 
plaintiffs.
182
 It avoided serious review of educational inequalities by 
adopting a far more permissive concept of a “thorough and efficient” 
education than other courts.
183
 It was enough, according to the court, that 
the state maintained a uniform funding formula.
184
 In a separate case in 
2015, the Colorado Supreme Court went even further, holding that a net 
reduction in statewide per-pupil expenditures was permissible, despite a 
recent constitutional amendment that mandated education spending rise at 
or above inflation annually.
185
 In short, Colorado opened the door to 
school funding litigation in 2009, only to slam it shut twice with tortured 
reasoning.  
The other state to reverse course was New Jersey. Since the 1970s, the 
New Jersey Supreme Court has been the most aggressive of any in 
enforcing education rights and duties.
186
 But in 2011, its enforcement 
 
 
 180. Lobato v. State, 218 P.3d 358 (Colo. 2009) (en banc). This holding was particularly 
significant given that a much earlier case had rejected a challenge to the state school finance system. 
Lujan v. Colorado State Bd. of Educ., 649 P.2d 1005 (Colo. 1982) (en banc). 
 181. Lobato, 304 P.3d at 1144 (Bender, C.J., dissenting). 
 182. Id. at 1136. 
 183. Compare id. at 1138–39 with Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859, 865–77 (W. Va. 1979) 
(surveying other states' interpretation of thorough and uniform in the context of education). In fact, the 
court had previously favorably cited to Pauley as recently as 2008. Lobato v. State, 218 P.3d 358, 372 
(Colo. 2009). Also curious is how fast the court reached its decision. The court heard arguments in 
early March and issued its sixty-six page opinion less than three months later.  
 184. Lobato v. State, 304 P.3d 1132, 1141 (Colo. 2013) (“The public school financing system is 
. . . ‘thorough and uniform’ . . . because it funds a system of free public schools that is of a quality 
marked by completeness, is comprehensive, and is consistent across the state. It does so using a multi-
faceted statutory approach that applies uniformly to all of the school districts in Colorado.”). 
 185. Dwyer v. State, 357 P.3d 185, 193 (Colo. 2015). In 2000, the voters had amended the 
constitution to provide per-pupil funding “shall grow annually at least by the rate of inflation plus an 
additional one percentage point.” COLO. CONST. art. 9, § 17.  
 186. See generally Alexandra Greif, Politics, Practicalities, and Priorities: New Jersey’s 
Experience Implementing the Abbott V Mandate, 22 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 615 (2004) (indicating 
that school finance litigation began in 1973 in New Jersey, continued for a quarter century and 
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showed signs of weakness. In 2008, in response to prior orders of the 
court, New Jersey passed a new statewide school funding formula that 
heavily weighted funding based on the percentage of low-income and 
special needs students in a district.
187
 In 2009, the Supreme Court found 
that the formula was constitutional, but indicated that the real test of its 
constitutionality would be whether the state fully funded the formula in 
coming years and confirmed that those funds were sufficient to meet 
student need.
188
 
Within a year, the state made massive cuts to the funding formula. The 
state reduced the education budget by $1.1 billion (15%) from the 
previous year, leaving funding $1.6 billion below what formulas projected 
as optimal.
189
 When plaintiffs challenged this reduction, the New Jersey 
Supreme Court’s response turned tepid. It wrote:  
Although there was no question that [the School Funding Reform 
Act] had not been funded at the levels called for by the formula, 
[the court needs] additional information . . . to consider “whether 
school funding through SFRA, at current levels, can provide for the 
constitutionally mandated thorough and efficient education for New 
Jersey school children.”190  
On that basis, it remanded the case and delayed any potential remedy.
191
 
When the case returned to the Supreme Court following a trial, the 
court’s initial signs of reluctance became clearer. According to the special 
master, the state had cut $1000 to $1500 per pupil (depending on a 
district’s poverty concentrations), “moved many districts further away 
from ‘adequacy,’” and imposed the greatest burdens on at-risk students.192 
But the Supreme Court could not manage more than one vote to restore 
statewide funding for at-risk students.
193
 Two of five justices would have 
entirely reversed the trajectory of education rights in the state, writing 
 
 
included numerous decisions against the state, major legislative overhauls, and concrete remedial 
demands). 
 187. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:7F-46 (West 2008). 
 188. Abbott ex rel. Abbott v. Burke, 971 A.2d 989, 992–93 (N.J. 2009) (“Our holding further 
depends on the mandated review of the formula's weights and other operative parts after three years of 
implementation” and “a continued commitment by the Legislature and Executive to address whatever 
adjustments are necessary”). 
 189. Abbott ex rel. Abbott v. Burke, 20 A.3d 1018, 1025–26 (N.J. 2011). 
 190. Id. at 1034. 
 191. Id. 
 192. Id. at 1034–35. 
 193. Id. at 1101 (Albin, J., concurring) (single judge favoring a state-wide remedy, but joining the 
majority to ensure a remedy for a narrower group of districts). 
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“this Court embarked on an initially well-intentioned [in 1973] but now 
fundamentally flawed and misguided approach to addressing the New 
Jersey Constitution’s promise that ‘[t]he Legislature shall provide for the 
maintenance and support of a thorough and efficient system of free public 
schools for the instruction of all the children in the State between the ages 
of five and eighteen years.’”194 The final tally was a narrow 3–2 decision 
that restored funding to a subset of school districts, but not all.
195
 In short, 
the court excused $600 million in cuts to disadvantaged districts.
196
 
With that said, one could reasonably count New Jersey as a victory. 
The court ordered the state to restore $500 million in funding to the 
original plaintiff districts and the governor, in relatively short order, 
acceded to the directive.
197
 In that respect, New Jersey stands alone against 
all other states since the recession. Moreover, this result was most likely 
only possible due to the strong precedent and management of the case 
across several decades. Yet, regardless of whether one characterizes New 
Jersey as a win or loss, the substance of the opinion revealed a substantial 
shift away from its more aggressive stances of the past and a failure to 
provide the full remedy that just a few years earlier the court had 
seemingly mandated.  
The most surprising decision, however, may have been in Texas in 
2016. Long after the end of the recession but in the midst of continued 
budget cuts, the Texas Supreme Court issued a decision  that may have 
move school finance precedent and litigation in an entirely new direction 
in the state.
198
 Prior to that decision, the Texas Supreme Court had 
consistently required the state to improve its school finance system. Since 
1989 alone, the Texas Supreme Court has issued six positive school 
finance decisions.
199
 Most recently, in 2005, the court held that the state’s 
tax system for supporting education was unconstitutional.
200
 It wrote “the 
 
 
 194. Id. at 1110 (quoting N.J. CONST. art. VIII, § IV, ¶ 1). 
 195. Id. at 1042–43. 
 196. Rebell, supra note 52, at 1879. 
 197. Chris Megerian, Christie says he won't fight N.J. Supreme Court order to add $500M in 
funding for poor school districts, nj.com, May 24, 2011, http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2011/05/ 
christie_says_he_will_comply_w.html. 
 198. Morath v. Texas Taxpayer & Student Fairness Coal., 490 S.W.3d 826 (Tex. 2016). 
 199. See, e.g., Neeley v. W. Orange-Cove Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist., 176 S.W.3d 746, 754 (Tex. 
2005); W. Orange-Cove Consol. I.S.D. v. Alanis, 107 S.W.3d 558, 562–63 (Tex. 2003); Edgewood 
Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Meno, 917 S.W.2d 717, 725 (Tex. 1995), as modified on Feb. 16, 1995; 
Carrollton-Farmers Branch Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist., 826 S.W.2d 489, 492 
(Tex. 1992); Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391, 391–92 (Tex. 1989), vacated in 
part, 804 S.W.2d 491 (Tex. 1991); Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 804 S.W.2d 491, 492 (Tex. 
1991). 
 200. Neeley, 176 S.W.3d at 800.  
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public education system has reached the point where continued 
improvement will not be possible without significant change,” and “it 
remains to be seen whether the system’s predicted drift toward 
constitutional inadequacy will be avoided by legislative reaction to 
widespread calls for changes.”201  
The 2016 decision offered a very different view. It overturned a trial 
court decision that had ruled in plaintiffs favor based on evidence that 
Texas schools were underfunded by $3.6 billion in 2010 and, after budget 
cuts, would be $6.1 billion underfunded in subsequent years.
202
 The court 
justified its holding by arguing that separation of powers concerns 
prevented it from intervening and that the connection between money and 
student outcomes was far too uncertain.
203
 Both points are troubling. 
Separation of powers concerns had not prevented the court from 
intervening numerous times in earlier school finance cases. The point 
about money ignores modern research and instead cites to arguments and 
relies on evidence that is fifty years old.
204
 In short, while the court 
recounted its prior decisions, its reasoning largely ignored them so as to 
reach a new disparate set of conclusions. 
Plaintiffs’ only outright victories came in Kansas and Washington. Yet, 
the aftermath of the cases has been equally troubling, as the legislatures in 
those states defied or evaded the courts’ orders. In 2006, the Kansas 
Supreme Court issued its fifth school finance decision in five years, 
finding that the state had finally implemented an appropriate remedy and 
could be expected to comply with the constitution in the future.
205
 When 
the recession hit and political leadership changed, the state reversed course 
and imposed major cuts in education funding.
206
 This led to new rounds of 
litigation and, in 2014, the Kansas Supreme Court again struck down the 
cuts as unconstitutional.
207
 But this time, the legislature simply ignored the 
courts,
208
 and later even threatened them with changes to judicial funding 
 
 
 201. Id. at 790. 
 202. Morath, 490 S.W.3d at 850. 
 203. Id. at 851–53. 
 204. Id. at 851–52. 
 205. Montoy v. State, 138 P.3d 755, 757–60 (Kan. 2006) (discussing the case history). 
 206. See generally David Sciarra & Wade Henderson, What’s the Matter with Kansas’ Schools?, 
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 7, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/08/opinion/whats-the-matter-with-
kansas-schools.html. 
 207. Gannon v. State, 319 P.3d 1196, 1251 (Kan. 2014).  
 208. Andrew Ujifusa, Kansas Lawmakers OK Shift to Block-Grant Funding, But Court Fight 
Looms, EDUC. WK. (Mar. 17, 2015), http://blogs.edweek.org/edweek/state_edwatch/2015/03/kansas_ 
lawmakers_ok_shift_to_block-grant_funding_but_court_fight_looms.html. The most the state has 
done to acquiesce is to propose a two year “time-out” while it determined the best course of action. 
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and appointment.
209
 Thus, notwithstanding a strong judicial stance, Kansas 
has become one of the most hostile states toward public education.
210
 Not 
until the court threatened to enjoin public schools from opening in fall 
2016 did the governor and legislature partially relent in the ongoing 
battle.
211
 
Washington’s legislature has not been as hostile, but it has been 
recalcitrant. In 2012, the Washington Supreme Court declared the state 
education system unconstitutional and set 2018 as the deadline for full 
implementation of a remedy.
212
 To ensure compliance and progress, it 
retained jurisdiction in the case.
213
 Two years later, the state had done 
almost nothing.
214
 Thus, in 2014, the court held the state in contempt.
215
 A 
year later in 2015, the state still had not acted, prompting the court to fine 
the state $100,000 a day until it came forward with a remedial plan.
216
 
With fines mounting, the state still had not acted months later.
217
 Again, 
this court’s resoluteness has not been enough to ensure that the state will 
carry out its constitutional duty. 
The last decision of note, Abbeville Cty. Sch. Dist. v. State, was 
technically a victory for the students of South Carolina, but the long 
history of the case has been very disappointing for the plaintiffs. The 
court’s 2014 decision ordering the state to act came more than two decades 
 
 
Rep. Don Hineman, House Moves to Repeal School Finance Formula (Mar. 14, 2015), 
http://www.hinemanforkansas.org/newsletters/newsletter-2015-03-14.html.  
 209. Edward M. Eveld, Threat by Kansas Lawmakers to Halt Court Funding Draws a Lawsuit 
from Four State Judges, KAN. CITY STAR (Sept. 9, 2015), http://www.kansascity.com/news/politics-
government/article34557753.html; Eligon, supra note 24.  
 210. See generally Ujifusa, supra note 208; LEACHMAN & MAI, supra note 36, at 12 (finding that 
from 2008 to 2012 Kansas enacted the sixth largest education cuts). 
 211. Molly Hunter, Kansas Legislature Meets Court’s Equitable Funding Duty Deadline, 
Allowing Schools to Open in the Fall, EDUC. L. PROF BLOG (July 8, 2016), http://lawprofessors. 
typepad.com/education_law/2016/07/kansas-legislature-meets-courts-equitable-funding-duty-deadline-
allowing-schools-to-open-in-the-fall.html.  
 212. McCleary v. State, 269 P.3d 227, 231, 261 (Wash. 2012). 
 213. Id. at 261. 
 214. Andrew Ujifusa, Washington State High Court Justices Grill Attorney for State on School 
Funding, EDUC. WK. (Sept. 3, 2014), http://blogs.edweek.org/edweek/state_edwatch/2014/09/wash_ 
st_supreme_court_justices_grill.html. 
 215. Order, McCleary v. State, No. 84362-7 (Wash. Sept. 11, 2014), http://www.courts.wa.gov 
/content/PublicUpload/Supreme%20Court%20News/84362-7%20order%20-%209-11-2014.pdf. 
 216. Order, McCleary v. State, No. 84362-7 (Wash. Aug. 13, 2015), http://www.educationjustice. 
org/newsletters/ej_newsblast_150814_McClearyOrder.pdf. 
 217. Betsy Hammond, Washington Schools Chief Won’t Run for Re-election, Blasts Others for 
Low School Funding, THE OREGONIAN (Oct. 22, 2015), http://www.oregonlive.com/education/index. 
ssf/2015/10/washington_schools_chief_wont.html. 
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after the plaintiffs first filed their case.
218
 This delay, in large part, was due 
to the court’s refusal to decide the case. The court took more than two 
years to decide whether plaintiffs could proceed to trial in 1999.
219
 When 
the case returned to the court in 2008, the court waited nearly six years to 
issue an opinion on the merits of a potential remedy—so long that at one 
point it scheduled a rehearing to refresh itself on the case.
220
  
At the very least, the case represents a court reluctant to enforce 
education rights until well after the recession had passed. If justice delayed 
is justice denied, the decision is surely a loss. Moreover, the long delayed 
final decision was ambiguous in its mandate, indicating that “[t]he 
Defendants and the Plaintiff Districts must identify the problems facing 
students in the Plaintiff Districts, and can solve those problems through 
cooperatively designing a strategy to address critical concerns and cure the 
constitutional deficiency . . . .”221 The court then allowed almost another 
full year to pass before issuing a timetable for the parties to devise a 
remedy,
222
 which it inexplicably withdrew just weeks later.
223
 Finally, 
notwithstanding its original demand that the state “design[] a strategy to 
address critical concerns and cure the constitutional deficiency evident in 
this case,”224 the court in September 2016 found the state had complied 
with its order by simply studying educational deficiencies in the state and 
approving minor increases in resources.
225
  
In sum, school quality and funding may have entered a new era at the 
start of the recession. Prior to the recession, evidence of stark inequities 
and inadequacies suggested a strong chance of victory before a state 
supreme court. Moreover, those outcomes produced a rich body of 
precedent favoring future enforcement when necessary. Since the 
recession, stark inequality, deep educational cuts, and precise statutory and 
constitutional language have not been enough to produce positive 
outcomes in any more than a few cases. Even when plaintiffs have won in 
court, they have most often lost before legislatures that have refused to 
respond. Whether this trend holds in the coming years is uncertain. Many 
 
 
 218. School Funding Cases in South Carolina, ACCESS (Dec. 2015), http://schoolfunding.info/ 
2011/11/school-funding-cases-in-south-carolina/ (last visited Sept. 17, 2016). 
 219. The case was appealed in 1997 and decided on April 22, 1999. Abbeville Cty. Sch. Dist. v. 
State, 515 S.E.2d 535, 536 (S.C. 1999). 
 220. Abbeville Cty. Sch. Dist. v. State, 767 S.E.2d 157, 161 (S.C. 2014). 
 221. Id. at 180.  
 222. Abbeville Cty. Sch. Dist. v. State, 777 S.E.2d 547 (S.C. 2015) (setting a timeline). 
 223. Abbeville Cty. Sch. Dist. v. State, 780 S.E.2d 609 (S.C. 2015) (withdrawing timeline). 
 224. Abbeville Cty. Sch. Dist. v. State, 767 S.E.2d 157, 180 (2014). 
 225. Abbeville Cty. Sch. Dist. v. State, Case No. 2007-06519, Order (Sept. 20, 2016). 
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other cases are pending and will provide courts new opportunities to 
intervene,
226
 but the judicial impotence in recent years has created 
institutional and enforcement problems that will not easily be overcome. 
B. Contingent Rights and Duties? 
None of the decisions rejecting adequacy or equity claims in recent 
years have indicated or directly suggested that the constitutional duties or 
rights in education are contingent or somehow afforded less weight during 
times of exigency. But the practical implication has been to do just that. 
Michael Rebell responded directly to this notion and persuasively argued 
that “[c]onstitutional rights are not conditional and they do not get put on 
hold because there is a recession.”227 The entire point in enshrining a right 
in a constitution is to remove it from economic, social, and political 
pressures. Whereas the value of a statutory right may be subject to 
variance and retraction over time, a constitutional right and the 
enforcement of it should remain constant.
228
 Federal decisions across 
numerous constitutional contexts confirm this principle.
229
 State supreme 
courts, moreover, have reached this same conclusion in the specific 
context of education funding. Older cases have held that the financial 
burden of providing education is not a basis for relieving the state of its 
constitutional obligation.
230
 Rather, education’s special constitutional 
 
 
 226. See, e.g., Conn. Coal. Just. Educ. Funding v. Rell, No. X07-HHD-CV-14-5037565-S (Conn. 
Super. Ct. filed Jan. 22, 2014); Martinez v. State, No. D-101-CV-2014-00793 (N.M. Dist. Ct. filed 
Nov. 14, 2014); Maisto v. State, No. 8997-08 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. filed Nov. 6, 2008); Hamilton Cty. Bd. Of 
Educ. v. Haslam, No. 15-1048-III (Tenn. Ch. Ct. filed Mar. 24, 2015). 
 227. Rebell, supra note 52, at 1861. 
 228. McCarthy v. Manson, 554 F. Supp. 1275, 1304 (D. Conn. 1982), aff’d, 714 F.2d 234 (2d Cir. 
1983) (“It is a fundamental principal of constitutional law that constitutional obligations cannot be 
avoided because of a lack of funding.”).  
 229. Rebell, supra note 52, at 1869 (quoting Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk Cnty. Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 
392 (1992)). See also Watson v. Memphis, 373 U.S. 526, 537 (1963) (“[C]onstitutional rights cannot 
be made dependent upon any theory that it is less expensive to deny than to afford them.”); Stone v. 
City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 968 F.2d 850, 858 (9th Cir. 1992) (“[F]ederal courts have repeatedly 
held that financial constraints do not allow states to deprive persons of their constitutional rights.”); 
Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305, 1315 (5th Cir. 1974) (“[C]onstitutional requirements are not, in this 
day, to be measured or limited by dollar considerations.”) (citations omitted).  
 230. Rose v. Council for Better Educ., 790 S.W.2d 186, 208 (Ky. 1989) (“[T]he financial burden 
entailed in meeting [education] responsibilities in no way lessens the constitutional duty”); Campbell 
Cty. Sch. Dist. v. State, 907 P.2d 1238, 1279 (Wyo. 1995) (“All other financial considerations must 
yield until education is funded.”). 
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status requires that states put education ahead of other priorities,
231
 
including during financial crisis.
232
  
Both Rebell and the courts on which he relies proceed under an 
absolutist approach to education rights. In an absolutist framework, either 
a constitutional right is inviolate and trumps all countervailing interests or 
the right does not exist.
233
 This understanding of constitutional rights is 
conventional wisdom in the United States
234
 and finds support in the fact 
that both federal and state constitutions speak in absolute terms.
235
 This is 
also specifically true of many state education clauses.
236
 From this 
absolutist concept follows the notion that constitutional rights “cannot be 
limited or overridden by competing considerations.”237 
 
 
 231. Campbell Cty. Sch. Dist., 907 P.2d at 1279; Brigham v. State, 692 A.2d 384, 391–92 (Vt. 
1997) (“Only one governmental service—public education—has ever been accorded constitutional 
status in Vermont”); West Virginia Educ. Ass’n v. State, 369 S.E.2d 454 (W. Va. 1988) (emphasizing 
education’s preferred constitutional status in striking down the state’s across the board cuts to state 
programs). See also NEV. CONST. art XII, Sec. 6 (requiring education to be funded before any other 
programs are funded). 
 232. Rebell, supra note 52, at 1871–73 (detailing the history of litigation in Washington and the 
final trial court decision holding that the state’s constitutional education duty “is not suspended in any 
part during periods of fiscal crisis, even where the existing tax revenue is not sufficient to fund [all of 
the] programs that the Legislature believes are necessary to meet the needs of the people”); Claremont 
v. Governor, 794 A.2d 744, 754 (N.H. 2002) (“[F]inancial reasons alone [do not excuse] the 
constitutional command that the State must guarantee sufficient funding to ensure . . . a 
constitutionally adequate education”); Butt v. State, 842 P.2d 1240, 1251–52 (Cal. 1992) (“The State 
argues that even if the District's fiscal problems threatened its students' basic educational equality, any 
State duty to redress the discrimination must be judged under the most lenient standard of equal 
protection review. . . . However, both federal and California decisions make clear that heightened 
scrutiny applies to State-maintained discrimination whenever the disfavored class is suspect or the 
disparate treatment has a real and appreciable impact on a fundamental right or interest.”; Abbott v. 
Burke, 798 A.2d 602, 603–04 (N.J. 2002) (rejecting state’s request for budgetary cap on education to 
ease other constraints).  
 233. See generally RONALD DWORKIN, Rights as Trumps, in THEORIES OF RIGHTS 153 (Waldron 
ed., 1984); RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977). But see Frederick Schauer, A 
Comment on the Structure of Rights, 27 GA. L. REV. 415, 422–25 (1993) (critiquing absolutist theories 
of rights). 
 234. Stephen Gardbaum, The Myth and the Reality of American Constitutional Exceptionalism, 
107 MICH. L. REV. 391, 416–19 (2008); See also Hugo Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 NYU L. REV. 
865, 874, 879 (1960) (arguing that the First Amendment is absolute and the courts have no power to 
change it). 
 235. For instance, the U.S. Constitution states that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the 
freedom of speech” and makes no allowance for exceptions. U.S. CONST. amend. I.  
 236. GA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1, para. I (“primary obligation of the State of Georgia”); N.J. CONST. 
art. VIII, § 4, para. 1 (“The Legislature shall provide for the maintenance and support of a thorough 
and efficient system of free public schools . . . .”); FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 1 (“paramount duty of the 
state to make adequate provision for the education of all children residing within its borders”). 
 237. Gardbaum, supra note 234, at 417. 
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The absolutist framing of education rights as non-contingent, however, 
owes more to rhetoric than reality.
238
 First, while state and federal 
constitutions are phrased in absolutist terms, courts do not apply them as 
such.
239
 From free speech and freedom of religion to privacy, liberty, and 
bodily autonomy, federal courts have inferred limits on those rights and 
instances where the government might infringe them.
240
 The same is true, 
albeit less litigated, at the state level. At best, constitutional rights carry a 
strong presumption against interference. But not all rights even carry this 
presumption.
241
 Thus, as a practical matter, constitutional rights are not 
absolute.  
Second, the assumption that rights are absolute raises the stakes of new 
rights recognition and enforcement. The assumption makes courts more 
reluctant to wade into rights analysis and recognition for fear that doing so 
eliminates external governmental limits on those rights.
242
 Moreover, 
affirmative constitutional rights, like education, would place immense and 
unflappable obligations on the government.
243
 In this respect, absolutist 
framing of rights may actually undermine the recognition and enforcement 
of rights. In other words, advocates who make too strong of a claim on 
behalf of education rights and duties may actually harm their own 
position. 
The more appropriate framing is not whether education rights are 
contingent, but the extent to which those rights are subject to limits. One 
 
 
 238. Scott Bauries seems to advocate for a more absolute recognition of education rights, but 
laments that “an individual right to education under state constitutions is more rhetoric than reality.” 
Bauries, supra note 32, at 953 (emphasis omitted). See also Barry Friedman, When Rights Encounter 
Reality: Enforcing Federal Remedies, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 735, 738–39 (1992) (“[R]ights receive far 
less respect than the rhetoric would suggest.”).  
 239. Gardbaum, supra note 234, at 416–19; Stephen Gardbaum, Limiting Constitutional Rights, 
54 UCLA L. REV. 789, 803–04 (2007); Schauer, supra note 233, at 417–18. Even Dworkin allows that 
his absolute framing of rights must give way to certain limits. DWORKIN, supra note 233, at 184–205. 
 240. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (educational value of diversity overrides 
prohibitions on consideration of race); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (promoting 
the life of child justifies burdens on woman’s bodily autonomy); New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 
(1984) (public safety justifies failure to appraise defendant of rights); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 
747, 756–58 (1982) (protection of children overrides First Amendment right). 
 241. Gardbaum, supra note 234, at 416–19. 
 242. See generally Mark Tushnet, Social Welfare Rights and the Forms of Judicial Review, 82 
TEX. L. REV. 1895 (2004); see also Helen Hershkoff & Stephen Loffredo, State Courts and 
Constitutional Socio-Economic Rights: Exploring the Underutilization Thesis, 115 PENN. ST. L. REV. 
923, 929 (2011) (noting how the recognition of affirmative rights narrows the scope of legislative 
discretion and power). 
 243. Tushnet, supra note 242; Hershkoff & Loffredo, supra note 242, at 932 (noting opposition to 
constitutionalizing rights because of “the demands that such rights will place on governing 
institutions.”). 
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can allow that constitutional rights, by their very nature, are not 
conditional in any formal or structural sense, but still acknowledge that 
real-world circumstances arise in which those rights cannot be fully 
enforced.
244
 Thus, the ultimate measure or nature of a right is not its 
formal or categorical framing, but the way in which it is implemented. 
Consistent with this notion, Joshua Weishart has minimized the 
distinctions in the precise language state courts use to describe education 
rights or duties.
245
 He correctly argues that what matters is whether and 
how the court enforces the constitutional clause in a given state.
246
 In other 
words, a focus on whether rights are formally contingent misses the more 
important points regarding how the actual enforcement and non-
enforcement of education rights shape the meaning and scope of those 
rights. 
As a practical matter, the constitutional rights and duties of education 
were frequently and vigorously enforced within a majority of states prior 
to the recession.
247
 Thus, education was recognized as a substantiated and 
an expansive right. Yet, with few exceptions, those cases were not tasked 
with identifying the circumstances under which education rights and duties 
might be limited or tempered. If education rights are not absolute, limits 
must exist. The recession provided ample opportunity for courts to engage 
this question, but none have. Instead, they have under-enforced rights 
without any transparent explanation. Moreover, the practical effect of 
judicial disengagement and under-enforcement is to undermine and retract 
previously established education rights and duties themselves—even if 
that is not the judiciary’s intent. More bluntly, rights are of little practical 
value if there is no remedy for their violation,
248
 and judicial 
disengagement makes the reemergence of those rights more difficult 
later.
249
  
 
 
 244. Schauer, supra note 233, at 419–21. 
 245. Joshua E. Weishart, Reconstituting the Right to Education, 67 ALA. L. REV. 915, 924 (2016). 
 246. Id. See also Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced 
Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212, 1221, 1263–64 (1978) (discussing normative value of 
constitutional rights). 
 247. Rebell, supra note 20. 
 248. KARL LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: ON OUR LAW AND ITS STUDY 94 (1960) 
(“Absence of remedy is absence of right. Defect of remedy is defect of right. A right is as big, 
precisely, as what the courts will do.”); Levinson, supra note 29, at 888–89 (“[T]he practical value of a 
right is determined by its associated remedies”). 
 249.  A right has often emerged after an initial rejection. Compare Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 
537 (1896) with Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). But the reestablishment of a right does 
not tend to occur after a longstanding withdrawal of that right. Compare Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 
717 (1974) with Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70 (1995).  
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C. Theorizing the Under-Enforcement of Education Rights and Duties 
The current under-enforcement of education rights and duties is a 
product of their past under-theorization by courts. As leading scholars 
have emphasized, the right to education is ill-defined in precedent and 
operates more on assumption and conjecture than analysis and 
implementation.
250
 The first step in addressing this problem is to clearly 
separate—in doctrine, assumptions, and conceptions—the right and duty 
of education from the remedies it might warrant. While rights without 
remedies are practically meaningless and the two cannot be entirely 
separated, rights and remedies are conceptually distinct.
251
 Rights involve 
matters of constitutional principle, whereas remedies can implicate public 
policy.
252
 Courts have primary responsibility for articulating the former, 
while legislatures are tasked with implementing the latter.
253
 But when 
courts incorporate remedial concerns into the separate question of rights 
identification, courts tend toward an absolutist concept of the right in 
question, and one in which courts may incorrectly perceive themselves as 
potentially asserting dominance in both constitutional principle and public 
policy. 
In educational adequacy and equity cases, state supreme courts have 
long feared the possibility that they might overstep the boundaries of their 
authority.
254
 As the Illinois Supreme Court wrote:  
[T]his court has assumed only an exceedingly limited role in 
matters relating to public education, recognizing that educational 
policy is almost exclusively within the province of the legislative 
branch. . . . [Moreover, t]o hold that the question of educational 
quality is subject to judicial determination would largely deprive the 
members of the general public of a voice in a matter which is close 
to the hearts of all individuals in Illinois.
255
  
 
 
 250. Bauries, supra note 32, at 977–89; Weishart, supra note 245. 
 251. See Friedman, supra note 238, at 738–39; Levinson, supra note 29, at 870–72. 
 252. DWORKIN, supra note 233, at 82–84, 90 (“Arguments of principle are arguments intended to 
establish an individual right; arguments of policy are arguments intended to establish a collective goal. 
Principles are propositions that describe rights; policies are propositions that describe goals.”); 
RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 220–24 (1986) [hereinafter EMPIRE]. 
 253. DWORKIN, EMPIRE, supra note 252, at 220–24. 
 254. Scott R. Bauries, Is There an Elephant in the Room?: Judicial Review of Educational 
Adequacy and the Separation of Powers in State Constitutions, 61 ALA. L. REV. 701, 705–06 (2010); 
William S. Koski, The Politics of Judicial Decision-Making in Educational Policy Reform Litigation, 
55 HASTINGS L.J. 1077, 1093–96 (2004).  
 255. Comm. for Educ. Rights v. Edgar, 672 N.E.2d 1178, 1189, 1191 (Ill. 1996). 
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A recession only further exaggerates those underlying concerns, 
particularly for those holding an absolutist concept of education. An 
absolute right would insist that legislative interests in dealing with 
economic crisis are of minimal, if any, importance.
256
 If so, the judicial 
recognition or enforcement of education rights would, in effect, lead to the 
judicial dominance over policy.  
This absolutist demand creates serious problems for courts. The 
absolutist right might either require more resources from a state than it 
could reasonably deliver during a time of crisis,
257
 or legislatures would 
rebuke and ignore the courts altogether. The practical effect of the former 
is untenable and, thus, courts would likely avoid cases raising that 
problem.
258
 The effect of the latter would be to undermine judicial 
authority itself.
259
 Recent legislative refusals to implement court ordered 
school funding reform in Kansas demonstrate that the latter is a real 
possibility.
260
 
Under-enforcing education rights and duties, however, carries equally 
serious consequences. First, under-enforcement undermines education 
rights themselves. As indicated above, the scope and practical value of a 
right is dictated by its enforcement, not its facial articulation.
261
 Thus, 
courts that espouse the existence of rights but under-enforce them are 
retracting, and potentially eviscerating, those rights.
262
  
Second, under-enforcement deprives marginalized stakeholders of a 
role in the education decisionmaking process and reinforces the status quo. 
As Charles Sabel and William Simon explain, the primary effect of 
 
 
 256. See Rebell, supra note 52. 
 257. See Tushnet, supra note 242, at 1895–97 (discussing the judicial disincentives for 
recognizing and enforcing social welfare rights). Adam Winkler emphasizes the prevalence of this 
thinking and debunks it in Fundamentally Wrong About Fundamental Rights, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 
227, 227–28 (2006).  
 258. Tushnet, supra note 242. 
 259. This concern, for instance, played prominently in the delayed enforcement of Brown v. Board 
of Education. See generally Paul Gewirtz, Remedies and Resistance, 92 YALE L.J. 585, 624–26 (1983) 
(discussing the Court’s tolerance for delays following Brown v. Board of Education). 
 260. See supra notes 205–10 and accompanying text. See also Weishart, supra note 245, at 920 
(discussing “increasing reluctance of courts to order remediation in the face of legislative deficiencies 
or outright defiance”). 
 261. Levinson, supra note 29, at 888–89 (“Finally, note that the limiting case of remedial 
substantiation is the absence of any remedy at all, rendering a constitutional right essentially 
worthless.”); Weishart, supra note 245.  
 262. See Weishart, supra note 245 (arguing that the right to education is in danger due to lingering 
doubts about its justiciability and the increasing reluctance of courts to order remediation in the face of 
legislative deficiencies or outright defiance). See also Simon-Kerr & Sturm, supra note 29, at 83–84 
(discussing courts’ increasing reliance on separation of powers concerns to withdraw from school 
finance litigation). 
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plaintiff victories in adequacy and equity cases is not necessarily an order 
mandating a specific increase in funding or remedy.
263
 Rather, the primary 
effect is instrumental. It often forces states to offer disadvantaged 
constituencies a seat at the decisionmaking table and seriously consider 
their substantive points.
264
 Thus, judicial intervention does not guarantee 
specific outcomes; it guarantees process. Moreover, by ensuring 
meaningful policy participation for otherwise excluded interests, school 
finance litigation destabilizes the status quo.
265
 But when courts withdraw 
from rights enforcement, they signal that the state can deny legitimate 
stake holders a meaningful role in policy formation and revert to the status 
quo.
266
 In education, this means funding structures that preference wealthy 
districts and middle-income students.
267
  
Third, under-enforcement excuses the state from justifying an override 
of its constitutional education duties. This excuse rests either on an 
unfounded assumption that the state has a sufficient override or on the 
notion that the state can assess the sufficiency of an override itself.
268
 Both 
are highly problematic. The former flies in the face of reasoned judicial 
decisionmaking and the notion that states cannot violate constitutional 
rights, save special circumstances. In other words, it amounts to a judicial 
abdication of duty. The latter is inconsistent with a constitutional scheme 
of governmental checks and balances, and eliminates any hope of 
impartial respect for constitutional rights and duties, as the legislature’s 
natural tendency is self-serving expedient policy. As the Kentucky 
Supreme Court wrote in justifying its first intervention in school finance: 
“To allow the General Assembly (or, in point of fact, the Executive) to 
decide whether its actions are constitutional is literally unthinkable.”269  
 
 
 263. Sabel & Simon, supra note 26.  
 264. Id. at 1067–71.  
 265. Id. at 1075–76, 1100. 
 266. See id. at 1075 (indicating that “[t]he liability determination reverses the normal presumption 
in favor of the status quo”). 
 267. Drawdowns in central state support for education mean that local districts are forced to 
support education themselves. Advantaged districts are relatively well suited to continue to support 
education during recession, whereas poorer districts are not. This then explains why the gap in 
education funding between wealthy and poor districts has grown so drastically over the past decade. 
See generally Barshay, supra note 26. This was, of course, the dominant funding paradigm that 
prompted school quality and funding litigation in the first instance in the 1970s. See, e.g., San Antonio 
Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). 
 268. Under either an absolutist or limited concept of education rights, this is problematic. The 
absolutist generally rejects the very notion of overrides, and the limited rights approach requires 
reasoned and substantiated justifications for overrides. See generally Gardbaum, Limiting, supra note 
239, at 791–93. 
 269.  Rose v. Council for Better Educ., 790 S.W.2d 186, 209 (Ky.1989). See also Lake View Sch. 
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Fourth, the practical effect of the foregoing is a reordering of 
preferences in direct opposition to constitutional text and precedent in 
many states.
270
 Education, either explicitly or implicitly, holds first order 
status under most constitutional schemes.
271
 This status may not excuse 
education from overrides, but it is meant to ensure that, at the very least, 
education is the first among equals in state obligations. Flat statewide 
reductions in spending in all government programs, for instance, would 
violate this first order status, as would more egregious cuts to education 
designed to avoid cuts in other areas where the government has less of an 
obligation.
272
 In short, while education cuts could theoretically be justified 
by some overriding interest—maybe financial exigency—those cuts 
cannot be justified by a reordering of political preferences that ignore 
education’s first order status.  
Because few courts have required states to justify education cuts since 
the recession, the extent to which the foregoing problems exist in any 
given state is uncertain. States’ motivations could have surely varied. 
Possible motivations for education cuts could have included (but are not 
limited to): averting state insolvency, protecting the basic integrity of other 
 
 
Dist. No. 25 v. Huckabee, 210 S.W.3d 28, 31 (Ark. 2005) (quoting Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 208–210) 
 270. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. IX, § 1 (“A general diffusion of knowledge and intelligence being 
essential to the preservation of the rights and liberties of the people, the Legislature shall encourage by 
all suitable means the promotion of intellectual, scientific, moral, and agricultural improvement.”) 
(emphasis added); FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 1 (“The education of children is a fundamental value of the 
people of the State of Florida. It is, therefore, a paramount duty of the state to make adequate provision 
for the education of all children residing within its borders.”); GA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1, ¶ I (“The 
provision of an adequate public education for the citizens shall be a primary obligation of the State of 
Georgia,[] . . .[the expense of which] shall be provided for by taxation.”); Nev. Const. art XII, Sec. 6 
(requiring the state to fund education before any other program); R.I. CONST. art. XII, § 1 (“The 
diffusion of knowledge, as well as of virtue among the people, being essential to the preservation of 
their rights and liberties, it shall be the duty of the general assembly to promote public schools . . . and 
to adopt all means which it may deem necessary and proper to secure to the people the advantages and 
opportunities of education . . .”) (emphasis added); Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 of King Cty. v. State, 585 
P.2d 71, 91 (Wash. 1978) (en banc) (“By imposing upon the State a paramount duty to make ample 
provision for the education of all children residing within the State’s borders, the constitution has 
created a “duty” that is supreme, preeminent or dominant.”); Campbell Cty. Sch. Dist. v. State, 907 
P.2d 1238, 1257, 1259 (Wyo. 1995) (“By establishing education first as a right in the Declaration of 
Rights article and then detailing specific requirements in a separate Education article in the state 
constitution, the framers and ratifiers ensured, protected and defined a long cherished principle” that 
“was viewed as a means of survival for the democratic principles of the state.”). 
 271. See, e.g., FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 1 (“paramount duty”); GA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1, ¶ I 
(“primary obligation of the State”); WASH. CONST. art. IX, § 1 (“paramount duty of the state”).  
 272. This is, of course, assuming that the cuts resulted in a problematic impairment of educational 
quality. Only systemic and substantial education harms would give rise to constitutional concerns. See, 
e.g., Sheff v. O’Neill, 678 A.2d 1267 (Conn. 1996); Serrano v. Priest, 226 Cal. Rptr. 584, 606–07 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 1986); Sheff v. O’Neill, 678 A.2d 1267 (Conn. 1996); Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 196–97. Thus, 
minor statewide cuts would not necessarily be unconstitutional.  
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government projects, efficient use of resources, balancing the budget, 
keeping taxes low, or political compromise or preference.
273
 The first two 
are the only interests that, on their face, even come close to justifying an 
override. The remaining interests are more akin to policy preference or 
convenience, rather than the types of overriding interests that courts 
typically require.
274
  
Regardless of what interest a state was pursuing, the recent cuts would 
likely fail on a means analysis. A state would face the problem of 
demonstrating that the level of education cuts was necessary. Many recent 
cuts have been broad based and flat, with little attention to nuance in 
regard to education, other programs, or alternatives.
275
 This is the exact 
opposite of the narrow tailoring or careful cuts constitutions would 
typically require. Cuts specifically targeting education would fare worse. 
The only cuts that could possibly survive means analysis would be those 
where education was spared the level of cuts that other programs suffered. 
But even then, the question would arise whether the state exerted 
sufficient effort to protect education. In short, good faith cuts based on 
 
 
 273. See, e.g., Michael Leachman et al., supra note 12, at 7–9 (discussing the reasons states cut 
education, including closing budget gaps as a result of the recession, the exhaustion of federal 
emergency aid for schools, rising costs, and tax cuts); PHIL OLIFF ET AL., CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y 
PRIORITIES, STATES CONTINUE TO FEEL RECESSION’S IMPACT (June 27, 2012), http://www.cbpp.org/ 
sites/default/files/atoms/files/2-8-08sfp.pdf (discussing states’ balanced budget requirements). See also 
JIM HULL CTR. FOR PUB. EDUC., CUTTING TO THE BONE: HOW THE ECONOMIC CRISIS AFFECTS 
SCHOOLS (Oct. 7. 2010), http://www.centerforpubliceducation.org/Main-Menu/Public-education/ 
Cutting-to-the-bone-At-a-glance/Cutting-to-the-bone-How-the-economic-crisis-affects-schools.html 
(describing state and local responses to the recession).  
 274. As the Court in Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 690 (1973), wrote:  
 [A]lthough efficacious administration of governmental programs is not without some 
importance, “the Constitution recognizes higher values than speed and efficiency.” And when 
we enter the realm of “strict judicial scrutiny,” there can be no doubt that “administrative 
convenience” is not a shibboleth, the mere recitation of which dictates constitutionality. On 
the contrary, any statutory scheme which draws a sharp line between the sexes, solely for the 
purpose of achieving administrative convenience, necessarily commands “dissimilar 
treatment for men and women who are . . . similarly situated,” and therefore involves the 
“very kind of arbitrary legislative choice forbidden by the [Constitution] . . . .”  
Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 275. Rebell, supra note 52, at 1862–63 (“[T]he response of most governors and legislatures to 
current budgetary pressures has been to . . . impose mandatory cost reductions—often, across-the-
board percentage reductions—without taking any steps to analyze the actual impact of these cuts 
. . . .”). North Carolina has gone so far as to drastically reduce education spending during the same 
time in which it was enacting new tax cuts. Leachman & Mazerov, supra note 47, at 2 (finding that 
North Carolina was one of the biggest tax cutting states). As Sabel and Simon explain, by securing 
disadvantaged groups a role in the decisionmaking process, school finance litigation has improved the 
deliberative process. Sabel & Simon, supra note 26, at 1076. It is the seeming absence of this process 
that has contributed to recent cuts. 
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serious exigencies is not enough. Constitutional analysis would also 
require that those cuts be thoughtful and minimal.
276
 
III. AVERTING RIGHTS RETRACTION 
Even if education rights have retracted over the past decade, serious 
questions remain as to whether courts could have done anything to prevent 
the retraction and whether education rights are doomed to suffer the same 
fate again in the future. The institutional power of courts has its limits, 
particularly during national economic crisis. The financial and political 
pressures of the recession made judicial intervention dangerous and 
potentially futile. From this perspective, the retraction of education rights 
may have been inevitable. This thinking, however, suffers from a 
conceptual flaw that incorrectly narrows the scope of rights articulation 
and enforcement. It rests on the notion that the delivery of education, and 
the judicial oversight and enforcement of rights, occurs at singular 
moments in time rather than over the course of years. 
The enforcement or non-enforcement of education rights today will 
have both short- and long-term effects. And those long-term effects may 
be even more important. The judiciary’s capacity to enforce education 
rights today is heavily influenced by past enforcement. Thus, today’s 
enforcement challenges are partially explained by poor enforcement 
strategies of the past, and tomorrow’s challenges will be exacerbated by 
what courts have done recently. The solution for education rights and 
duties during economic crisis is not to ignore them and assume that more 
convenient interventions will come later. Instead, education rights are best 
protected by enforcing them prior to the onset of exigency. Earlier, less 
contested intervention points offer courts the opportunity to adopt 
principles and structures that help ensure the vitality of education rights 
during later crisis. This involves courts evaluating education rights both 
prospectively and retrospectively and requiring that states not only cure 
existing deficiencies, but also plan for future exigencies. The following 
subparts further explore the justification for prospective analysis and the 
specific judicial responses it should generate, including deterrence-based 
remedies, prophylactic rules, and prophylactic decisionmaking structures, 
all of which decrease the likelihood of constitutional violations in the first 
instance. 
 
 
 276. Rebell, supra note 52, at 1908–09. 
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A. The Educational Imperative for Long-Term Compliance 
School finance decisions tend to analyze educational opportunity at 
particular moments in time and order remedies in response to that 
moment. In other words, the question before a court in 2005 would have 
been whether the education system challenged in 2002 violated the state 
constitution. The remedy, should a court order one, is in response to that 
temporal violation. While this temporal framing is inherent to litigation, 
the constitutional duty to deliver education—or a failure in regard to it—
does not occur at a finite moment in time. Not even a single year captures 
the duty or rights at stake.  
In this respect, education is relatively unique. Other constitutional 
rights, such as free speech, privacy, and due process are violated at 
particular moments in time.
277
 For the same reason, they are susceptible to 
narrower remedies.
278
 But education is an ongoing project that requires 
constant vigilance—the failure of which can span over years and decades. 
In addition, given the nature of learning, educational harms and failures 
are not easily remedied after the fact.
279
 For that reason and potentially as 
a matter of convenience, past courts typically do almost nothing to remedy 
the education harms that precede litigation.
280
 Rather, the past violations 
serve as the basis for insisting on current constitutional compliance.  
Consider, for instance, that plaintiffs sued South Carolina in 1997, 
secured the right to proceed to trial from the Supreme Court in 1999, but 
did not secure an order for a remedy until 2014.
281
 By then, not a single 
student on whose behalf the case was initially brought ever saw a remedy, 
even though it was the violation of their rights that justified the court’s 
order. Moreover, even had the court wanted to provide a remedy for those 
individuals, it is far from clear what an appropriate remedy would be. Or 
 
 
 277. See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992) (challenge to a prayer offered at middle 
school graduation ceremony in 1989); Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984) 
(involving fight to have access to protest in national park area during winter of 1982).  
 278. See, e.g., Lee, 505 U.S. at 599 (simply holding that the prayer was forbidden); Carey v. 
Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 248 (1978) (awarding only nominal damages for deprivation of due process 
because no actual injury occurred).  
 279. See generally Derek W. Black, Civil Rights, Charter Schools, and Lessons to Be Learned, 64 
FLA. L. REV. 1723 (2012). 
 280. See, e.g., Liebman, supra note 32; Black, supra note 279, at 1764–67 (examining the 
difficulty of pinpointing and remedying harm in education cases). See also John C. Jeffries, Jr., In 
Praise of the Eleventh Amendment and Section 1983, 84 VA. L. REV. 47, 79 (1998) (“Nonretroactivity 
facilitate[s] the creation of new rights by reducing the costs of innovation.”). 
 281. Abbeville Cty. Sch. Dist. v. State, 767 S.E.2d 157 (S.C. 2014); Abbeville Cty. Sch. Dist. v. 
State, 515 S.E.2d 535 (S.C. 1999). 
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to put it more bluntly, education rights cannot be effectively fulfilled after 
they are breached. Rather, courts only ensure full constitutional 
compliance by insisting on it in advance and deterring later relapses. This 
practical reality, thus, demands that courts not only shape remedies to 
bring states into current compliance, but also require the state to take steps 
to ward off the possibility of new state violations.  
1. Deterring Constitutional Violations 
One of the most obvious ways courts can ensure future compliance is 
to deter violations themselves. While the notion of deterrence is inherent 
in the concept of law and the issuing of judicial opinions, actual deterrence 
rests on awareness of what the law proscribes, certainty of its 
consequences, and the gravity of those consequences.
282
 Constitutional 
education clauses do not “speak for themselves” in any of these deterrence 
factors. Rather, courts have an enormous role to play in this deterrence 
function. But most have failed to step up. Too many equity and adequacy 
decisions of the past have been vague as to what the law proscribes, when 
they will actually impose consequences, and what those consequences will 
entail.  
First, as explored in detail in the next part, orders and standards in 
equity and adequacy cases often come more in the form of general 
guidelines. Scott Bauries, for instance, critically characterizes them as 
nothing more than “legislative holdings” that include broad policy goals 
for the legislature to pursue.
283
 Putting aside for the moment exactly how 
these orders might become more definite, the fact remains that states rarely 
have clear notice of how to comply with their constitutions.
284
 As a result, 
the deterrent value is minimal. 
Second, a state must, at the very least, believe it will be held 
accountable at some point and in some way for constitutional education 
rights to serve as any deterrent. Courts substantiate this belief by 
consistent and firm enforcement of education rights. They do the opposite 
with uncertain and sporadic enforcement. On the other hand, courts can 
enhance the long-term value of a right and the likelihood of future 
compliance by the very act of current accountability. In the absence of 
 
 
 282. See generally Daniel S. Nagin, Deterrence in the Twenty-First Century, 42 CRIME & JUST. 
199, 205–07 (2013). 
 283. Bauries, supra note 32, at 986–87.  
 284. Bauries argues that education opinions produce a learned helplessness on the part of 
legislatures. Id. at 987. 
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current accountability, a state becomes more likely to push, if not 
transgress, the boundaries of permissible action.
285
 States’ actions during 
and, more importantly, following the recession show that they increasingly 
believe that they can get away with violating education rights.  
Third, a belief in accountability alone is not enough to deter violations. 
To be effective, the cost of a violation must be sufficiently high that it 
significantly discounts the perceived benefits of neglecting the right.
286
 
With educational equity and adequacy, however, states do not face any 
real cost for depriving students of educational opportunity. To the 
contrary, significant incentives exist for states to violate education rights 
and delay compliance. Education courts have never asked that states 
actually remediate past harms in any significant way. The burden of lost 
educational opportunities in previous years falls squarely on students, not 
on the state.
287
 Thus, a state, for matters of convenience or policy 
prerogative, can divert education resources with no consequences and, in 
fact, reap the benefits of that diversion without any threat of reparation.
288
  
The threat and imposition of remedies for sustained injuries, not just 
generalized system-wide injunctions, would change states’ entire 
orientation toward constitutional compliance.
289
 Even short of completely 
retroactive remedies, courts could impose costs on the failure to comply 
after an initial finding of liability. Dealing with the most recalcitrant of 
legislatures, at least two school finance courts have imposed daily fines on 
 
 
 285. See Erwin Chemerinsky, The Segregation and Resegregation of American Public Education: 
The Courts’ Role, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1597 (2003) (reasoning that resegregation was hastened by the 
Supreme Court’s holdings); Levinson, supra note 29, at 904–05; GARY ORFIELD & CHUNGMEI LEE, 
THE CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT, HISTORIC REVERSALS, ACCELERATING RESEGREGATION, AND THE NEED 
FOR NEW INTEGRATION STRATEGIES 5 (2007), https://civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/k-12-
education/integration-and-diversity/historic-reversals-accelerating-resegregation-and-the-need-for-new-
integration-strategies-1/orfield-historic-reversals-accelerating.pdf (arguing resegregation took hold 
because the Court countenanced it).  
 286. See Aaron Xavier Fellmeth, Civil and Criminal Sanctions in the Constitution and Courts, 94 
GEO. L.J. 1, 53–56 (2005) (discussing the economics of deterrence). 
 287. See Bauries, supra note 32, at 999–1006 (pointing out that school funding remedies do not 
address the individual harms that students suffer). See also Liebman, supra note 32, at 1513–18 (citing 
as a fundamental flaw in desegregation that court orders did nothing to address the harms that 
previously segregated students suffered). 
 288. Voting offers analogous problems. See Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475, 483, 488 (1903). 
(“Unless [the Court were] prepared to supervise the voting in that State by officers of the court, it 
seems to us that all that the plaintiff could get from equity would be an empty form.”). 
 289. See Liebman, supra note 32, at 1513–17 (analyzing the problem of under-corrective remedies 
in school desegregation and the need for complete remedies of the harms suffered); Bauries, supra 
note 32. 
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legislatures that failed to enact remedies for existing violations.
290
 The cost 
of non-compliance produced a relatively quick and effective response.
291
 
Fines may be but a small fraction of the cost of the constitutional violation 
and, as such, fall far short of imposing a complete deterrent cost. But they 
still clearly indicate some cost for current and future non-compliance and 
serve, at least, as moderate deterrents. Extending this approach to future 
lower court opinions, putting states on notice that equivalent fines will be 
imposed on future legislatures that delay remedies through appeals 
following adverse decisions in lower courts would offer additional 
deterrents.
292
 The point here is simple: states have an ongoing obligation 
to deliver a constitutional education and the failure to do so should carry a 
cost. 
2. Adopting Clear and Prophylactic Rules 
Without awareness that its action is clearly a constitutional violation, 
there is almost no reason to expect that a legislature would forego policies 
that it otherwise favors. This problem is particularly acute in education 
because demonstrating deprivations of educational adequacy and equity 
are so fact intensive.
293
 Per se violations simply do not exist. This leaves 
an enormous gray area in which a state operates without any clear 
expectation that it will be held accountable. This problem exists regardless 
of exigencies. A state may only know that it has violated its education 
duty when the court informs the state of its violation.
294
  
 
 
 290. Flores v. Arizona, 405 F. Supp. 2d 1112, 1120–21 (D. Ariz. 2005) vacated and remanded, 
Flores v. Rzeslawski, 204 F.App’x 580 (9th Cir. 2006). But see Koski, supra note 31, at 1190 
(characterizing contempt as a symbolic statement in school funding litigation). 
 291. Flores v. Arizona, 516 F.3d 1140, 1151 (9th Cir. 2008), rev’d, Horne v. Flores 557 U.S. 433 
(2009) (indicating the state enacted a complete remedy within a few months of the fines). The New 
Jersey Supreme Court, in effect, issued an inverse fine, indicating it would enjoin all education 
spending unless the state met the court’s deadline. Robinson v. Cahill, 358 A.2d 457, 459 (N.J. 1976). 
But see Order, McCleary v. State, No. 84362-7 (Wash. Sept. 11, 2014), http://www.courts. 
wa.gov/content/PublicUpload/Supreme%20Court%20News/84362-7%20order%20-%209-11-2014.pdf 
(imposing fines on the state for inaction); Hammond, supra note 217 (indicating that months after the 
fines were imposed the state of Washington had still not acted). 
 292. The cost of litigation itself has been sufficient to deter certain actions by state legislatures. 
See, e.g., Molly A. Hunter, Maryland Enacts Modern, Standards-Based Education Finance System: 
Reforms Based on Adequacy Cost Studies, ACCESS (May 2002), http://www.schoolfunding.info/ 
resource_center/research/MDbrief.pdf. 
 293. Black, supra note 5. 
 294. This reality also challenges courts’ institutional authority. While the Court may be the 
ultimate arbiter of the Constitution, its arbitrations should not appear arbitrary to other branches of the 
government or the citizenry. Rather, its holdings should include standards by which the state could 
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School finance adjudications should not appear arbitrary to other 
branches of government or the citizenry. Such a perception challenges 
courts’ institutional authority, even when the outcomes in a case are 
correct. A move toward judicial holdings that include standards that allow 
the executive or legislative branch to judge the constitutionality of their 
own actions would reinforce the notion that the states’ constitutional 
education duty is governed by legal principles not simply judicial wisdom 
or judgment. None of this is to suggest equity and adequacy opinions have 
not been decided on principle. Nor is it to suggest that the formulation and 
enforcement of education standards are easy. History shows that clearly is 
not the case.
295
  
Select prophylactic rules, however, would make the management of 
these standards easier for both courts and states.
296
 Criminal law and free 
speech doctrine are instructive on this point. For instance, as the Court 
explained in Miranda v. Arizona, “without proper safeguards the process 
of in-custody interrogation” would undermine individuals’ right against 
self-incrimination.
297
 The solution was to mandate that the state 
“effectively apprise[]” suspects of their rights in advance.298 Free speech 
doctrine is similarly grounded in the notion of prophylactic safeguards. 
For instance, the Court has held that it will strike down state attempts to 
limit speech outside the zone of protected speech because doing so is 
necessary to protect speech that lies at the core of First Amendment 
concerns.
299
  
Compared to self-incrimination and free speech, educational equality 
and adequacy are admittedly more amorphous rights and, thus, do not as 
easily lend themselves to prophylactic rules. Nonetheless, meaningful 
 
 
judge its own actions and believe that constitutional duty in regard to education is governed by legal 
principles not simply judicial wisdom. 
 295. The difficult implementation of No Child Left Behind is an obvious example. The Act 
required “challenging” academic standards and full student proficiency, neither of which were met. 
Paul E. Peterson & Frederick M. Hess, Few States Set World-Class Standards, 8 EDUC. NEXT 70, 71–
73 (2008); Dillon, supra note 75 (predicting that the number of failing schools would reach 80,000 out 
of 100,000 in 2011).  
 296. See generally David A. Strauss, The Ubiquity of Prophylactic Rules, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 190, 
191 (1988). 
 297. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966). 
 298. Id. 
 299. See, e.g., Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50, 59–60 (1976) (indicating the Court 
permits “a defendant whose own speech was unprotected . . . to challenge the constitutionality of a 
statute” that discourages individuals from “constitutionally protected speech or expression.”); see also 
Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41 (1999) (striking down a loitering statute directed at gang activity 
because of its incidental effects on individuals’ liberty right to remain in place or move from place to 
place). 
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rules are within courts’ reach. In fact, relatively recent changes to two 
states’ constitutional education clauses include such rules. Florida’s new 
constitution articulates a broad right to high quality education, but then 
specifies the exact classroom sizes that the right requires.
300
 Colorado’s 
constitution, likewise, mandates a minimum percentage of yearly increases 
in state education funding.
301
 Imposing that level of specificity would most 
likely be beyond courts, but the New Jersey Supreme Court has managed 
analogous results by mandating that disadvantaged districts be funded at a 
level no lower than the average per-pupil expenditure in high-performing 
suburban districts.
302
 This prophylactic rule is defensible because the 
substance of funding levels remains with the state—the level at which the 
state unilaterally decides to fund suburbs—and effective because the state 
has been issued a clear and definite requirement.  
Similar rules could have helped manage education cuts during and 
following the recession. The easiest is an absolute bar on reductions. 
Unfortunately, such a rule would be illegitimate because it rejects the 
possibility of a state override and the possibility the state might reduce 
costs through efficiency or identify wastes to eliminate.
303
 Thus, the 
challenge is devising prophylactic rules that reasonably distinguish 
efficiency reductions from quality reductions.  
With additional tweaking, basic parity rules analogous to those 
previously used in New Jersey could navigate these distinctions. First, a 
rule could prohibit unequal retrogression in education resources. A state 
would remain free to reduce its education budget, but those reductions 
could not be flat because the effect of flat reductions works to the per se 
disadvantage of needy districts.
304
 This principle would be defensible 
under the premise that low-wealth districts and those serving 
predominantly high-need students have never operated with substantially 
more teachers and resources than necessary to deliver appropriate 
educational opportunities.
305
 At best, these districts’ resources were just 
 
 
 300. FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 1. 
 301. COLO. CONST. art. IX, § 17.  
 302. Abbott v. Burke, 693 A.2d 417, 439 (N.J. 1997). 
 303. Even Rebell allows that careful efficiency cuts can be made without sacrificing educational 
quality. Rebell, supra note 52, at 1893–94. 
 304. See generally Bruce D. Baker, Evaluating the Recession’s Impact on State School Finance 
Systems, 22 EDUC. POL’Y ANALYSIS ARCHIVES 1 (2014), http://epaa.asu.edu/ojs/article/view/1721. 
 305. See generally USHOMIRSKY & WILLIAMS, supra note 52 (finding a substantial nation funding 
gap before and after factoring in student need). 
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adequate prior to the recession.
306
 Thus, any state reductions would need 
to be disproportionately weighted against advantaged districts, particularly 
given that they can offset those reductions.
307
 Such a rule would not ensure 
absolute equality or adequacy, as any loss of any funds might be 
problematic in needy districts, but it would amount to a clear rule that 
operates well within the boundaries of prohibiting presumptively 
unconstitutional action. 
A simpler second rule might, during instances of recession, prohibit 
class sizes in disadvantaged districts from rising higher than the prevailing 
class sizes and expenditures in some other subset of advantaged or high-
performing districts. Similarly, a rule might prohibit total per-pupil 
expenditures in disadvantaged districts from declining more than other 
districts. These comparative thresholds would achieve an important 
substantive qualitative end, without calling on courts to specifically define 
the substance. Advantaged school districts may cut resources during 
recession, but they are unlikely to cut to the point of seriously jeopardizing 
the quality of the children’s education.308 Thus, during times of economic 
crisis, successful districts offer a reasonable measure of efficient and 
minimum education requirements.
309
 The practical result of requiring 
parity of this sort may be just to hold resources and class sizes constant in 
needy districts. If so, budget cuts might fall almost entirely on other 
districts. In other instances, it would set a floor that mandates a finite and 
smaller set of reductions in needy districts. 
3. Encouraging Structural Changes to Decisionmaking 
The most effective means of avoiding problematic judicial intervention 
during moments of crisis may not involve rules at all. Instead, the most 
effective solution is to have prophylactic structures already in place to help 
guide states in decisionmaking and planning. A better decisionmaking 
process can help move states toward equality and adequacy during good 
times and ward off retrogression during bad times. To be clear, 
 
 
 306. A funding fairness study of 2006–07 expenditures found that only fourteen states were even 
arguably distributing funds fairly and only nineteen were making reasonable efforts to raise adequate 
education funds. BRUCE D. BAKER, ET AL, IS SCHOOL FUNDING FAIR? A NATIONAL REPORT CARD 19, 
26–27 (2010), http://www.schoolfundingfairness.org/National_Report_Card.pdf. 
 307. Id. 
 308. Michael Rebell argues that parents in advantaged districts know that money matters, which is 
why they devote appropriate funds to their schools. Rebell, supra note 20, at 1478–79. 
 309. Studies regularly use successful districts as baselines for assessing adequacy. See Superfine, 
supra note 156, at 665–67 (describing the successful school district model for assessing the necessary 
education costs). 
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prophylactic structures do not guarantee substantively acceptable 
outcomes, but they make optimal outcomes more likely and reversion to 
the traditional inadequate and inequitable status quo less likely. Avoiding 
the latter is a central aspect of delivering constitutionally appropriate 
educational opportunities. Moreover, the failure to plan for exigencies 
today is a concession to the fact that the state will at some point fail to 
maintain a constitutional education system in the future. Thus, imposing 
structures that force the state to plan ahead are not necessarily prophylactic 
at all but part of a state’s current duty to ensure educational opportunities. 
First, states must, as a matter of routine, incorporate expert knowledge 
into funding decisions. Education budgets and funding formulas typically 
follow one of two paths: a majority rules democratic process that tends 
toward inequitable results, or a process driven by expert analysis that tends 
toward meeting student need. Absent judicial oversight, the former has 
been the de facto rule in nearly all states. Based on this reality, courts 
could reasonably mandate a structure in line with the latter, requiring 
annual or biannual expert assessments of educational need and cost.
310
  
While significant, such a mandate would still be relatively mild and not 
involve the judiciary encroaching on the legislature’s substantive 
decisionmaking—which is often the critique of school funding 
opinions.
311
 Rather, the mandate would be for the state to determine the 
real cost of education in the state. In other words, if the state has a 
constitutional duty to deliver an adequate education, it necessarily has a 
duty to determine, rather than guess at, the cost of that education. Per this 
reasoning, a number of courts have previously ordered states to conduct 
cost-out studies.
312
 The difference in the current proposal would be the 
permanency of the expert judgment and its structural role in informing the 
state’s policymaking.  
Second, even with expert assessments structurally in place, courts 
would still need to ensure that states act reasonably based on that 
knowledge. Knowledge alone does not guarantee the state will act 
accordingly based on that knowledge. Some states have statutory schemes 
for costing out education, but still consistently fail to fund the programs, 
 
 
 310. See, e.g., Lake View v. Huckabee, 91 S.W.3d 472, 510–11 (Ark. 2002) (affirming the lower 
court’s order for the state to conduct an adequacy funding study); Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. New 
York, 2005 WL 5643844, at *2 (discussing special masters’ recommendation that the state “undertake 
periodic studies to determine the costs of providing the opportunity for a sound basic education to all 
students of the New York City schools”). 
 311. Bauries, supra note 254. 
 312. See Superfine, supra note 156, at 664–65. 
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even during good economic times.
313
 Courts could counteract states’ 
tendency to abandon expert judgment by giving the expert assessments 
presumptive weight in later disputes.
314
 Or this presumption could be built 
into the structure of the budget building process and challenges to it.  
A state could fund education below the experts’ proposed level, but 
bear the burden of showing why a lower level was still adequate.
315
 And 
districts or populations negatively affected by those cuts might also be 
ensured an opportunity to counter the state’s position. As precedent stands, 
the judicial presumption is that current education systems are 
constitutional.
316
 While that presumption might still be appropriate as a 
general matter, a state that acted against expert judgment and failed to 
substantiate its actions would not necessarily be owed that deference if the 
dispute later made its way to court. Putting the state on notice of a 
presumption would incentivize the state to include this presumption in its 
own decisionmaking. 
Third, a state’s decisionmaking process and structure must ward off 
situations in which continued educational quality is seemingly the enemy 
of a state’s financial stability or its ability to deal with crisis. No structure 
is likely to dissuade problematic education cuts when a state lacks or 
believes it lacks the resources to fund education at appropriate levels. In 
this instance, many states will ignore the results of any year-to-year budget 
making process a court might urge into place. Thus, the solution is, again, 
structural reform that moves states to plan against future exigency, 
emphasizing that planning for the future is part of a state’s current 
education duty.  
In particular, states must set aside sufficient rainy-day funds or make 
other provisions for circumstances in which the state might otherwise be 
 
 
 313. See, e.g., Arielle Dreher, 108 Mississippi United Methodist Pastors Endorse Initiative 42, 
JACKSON FREE PRESS (Oct. 22, 2015), http://www.jacksonfreepress.com/weblogs/jackblog/2015/ 
oct/22/108-mississippi-united-methodist-pastors-endorse-i/ (indicating that Mississippi fails to fully 
fund its statutory funding formula nearly every year).  
 314. One of the problems in New York is that the court did not apply such a presumption, but 
simply assessed the state’s adequacy judgment from a reasonableness standard. See Campaign for 
Fiscal Equity v. State, 861 N.E.2d 50, 59–60 (N.Y. 2006). 
 315. This exact type of reasoning is what justified the New Jersey Supreme Court’s major 
intervention in 1990. “[N]o amount of money may be able to erase the impact of the socioeconomic 
factors that define and cause these pupils’ disadvantages. . . . [But] even if not a cure, money will help, 
and . . . these students are constitutionally entitled to that help.” Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359, 403 
(N.J. 1990). 
 316. See, e.g., Rose v. Council for Better Educ., 790 S.W.2d 186, 209 (Ky. 1989) (“The 
presumption of constitutionality is substantial.”); Leandro v. State, 488 S.E.2d 249, 261 (1997) 
(requiring “a clear showing” that students have not received an adequate education before intruding on 
the other branches of government).  
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unable to meet its education obligations.
317
 Only the rarest state will carry 
out its long-term duty during times of stress if it has not planned ahead.
318
 
Exactly how it plans ahead should be left to the state’s discretion. A state 
might set aside a certain percentage of funds each year to cover future 
education shortfalls or develop a bond system to draw upon during 
recession. But given states’ past practices and the nature of funding cycles, 
whether the state plans ahead cannot be left to chance; it is part of its duty.  
Finally, forcing structural decisionmaking changes on states is possible 
without specifically defining or dictating that structure. Formal structural 
changes to the legislative process are beyond the power of the judiciary 
and would be inappropriate in any event. But sub-legislative changes are 
well within the judiciary’s power and can be achieved indirectly. The most 
poignant example comes from the U.S. Supreme Court’s attempt to limit 
Congress’s use of remedial power under the 14th and 15th Amendments.  
In a series of cases, the Court reaffirmed that it was the final arbiter of 
the meaning of constitutional guarantees and that Congress needed to 
justify its exercise of power under the 14th and 15th Amendments with 
evidence consistent with the Court’s interpretation.319 Putting aside 
substantive critiques of the Court’s agenda in those cases,320 the effect was 
for Congress to change its approach to legislating in this area.
321
 Rather 
than just passing legislation it believed to be good policy, it held extensive 
hearings and gathered specific types of evidence—all of which went to the 
issues the Court had identified.
322
 When legislation was later litigated, the 
 
 
 317. Some school districts already have funds, but the size of those reserves have not been enough 
to offset massive statewide cuts. See generally Thomas Jefferson Classical Acad. Charter Sch. v. 
Cleveland Cty., 763 S.E.2d 288 (N.C. Ct. App. 2014) (case involving the proper use of a district’s 
rainy day funds and a charter schools ability to access those funds). 
 318. Within two years of the recession, thirty-four states had already cut K-12 education funding. 
NICHOLAS JOHNSON ET AL., CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES, AN UPDATE ON STATE BUDGET 
CUTS: AT LEAST 46 STATES HAVE IMPOSED CUTS THAT HURT VULNERABLE RESIDENTS AND CAUSE 
JOB LOSS 1 (Feb. 9, 2011), http://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/3-13-08sfp.pdf. The 
only programmatic area cut more often was higher education. Id. 
 319. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (finding legislation was not a proportional 
and congruent remedy for gender discrimination); Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (articulating 
a congruence and proportionality test to assess the constitutionality of individual rights legislation).  
 320. The critique here is not that the Court made Congress (i.e., the government) respect rights, 
which would be the case in an analogous state education case, but that the Court restricted Congress’s 
independent ability to protect individual rights. See, e.g., Evan H. Caminker, “Appropriate” Means-
Ends Constraints on Section 5 Powers, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1127, 1129 (2001). 
 321. See, e.g., Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 at 619–20 (evaluating the extensive congressional record, 
which was a response to the Court’s holding in Boerne). 
 322. See, e.g., id.; Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 811 F. Supp. 2d 424, 435–38 (D.D.C. 2011) (describing 
the vast legislative record and hearings supporting the Voting Rights Act of 2006, which then became 
the basis for the Supreme Court’s later decision in the same case at 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013)). 
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congressional record became the conclusive evidence in the case and 
drawn-out battles over new and additional evidence were avoided.
323
 A 
state court that was similarly clear about the elements and issues that 
should be involved in positive lawmaking, the restrictions and 
justifications it would place on retrogressive law making, and the weight it 
would afford to certain types of evidence would impose constitutional 
discipline on states without actually dictating the specific decisionmaking 
reforms the state must incorporate. 
B. The Virtues and Vices of Proactive Intervention 
A legislative or administrative structure incorporating these elements, 
although far from fool-proof, would come with several advantages. It 
would, in effect, set up a process for testing a state’s override of its 
educational duties—the key constitutional issue noted above that has 
evaded serious judicial review. It would also speed a potential lawsuit 
toward a judgment on the merits and a remedy, as opposed to the current 
drawn-out litigation that permits states to enact budget cuts on a whim and 
dare courts to reprimand them years after the fact.
324
 New Jersey has many 
background factors that make favorable education outcomes more likely, 
but the reality of an analogous structure (in the form of special masters, 
direct review and original jurisdiction before the state supreme court) 
surely played no small role in plaintiffs’ ability to block massive cuts to at 
least the neediest districts during the recession.
325
 In fact, New Jersey was 
the only state that, as a matter of constitutional law, reversed cuts. 
In response to clear and consistent prior enforcement of prophylactic 
measures, the New Jersey legislature had enacted new legislation to 
fundamentally alter the way it funded schools in 2008.
326
 Rather than just 
guess at the cost of education, New Jersey set up “a careful and 
deliberative process [to] . . . determin[e] the educational inputs necessary 
to provide a high-quality education” and “the actual cost of providing” 
it.
327
 It then also created a funding formula that was tied to those costs, but 
that also accounted for “the unique problems and cost disadvantages faced 
 
 
 323. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598; Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013). 
 324. See generally Black, supra note 5 (detailing the extensive evidence and issues involved in 
school funding cases). 
 325. Abbott ex rel. Abbott v. Burke, 20 A.3d 1018 (N.J. 2011) (striking down state’s failure to 
fully fund the formula for the plaintiff districts).  
 326. Abbott ex rel. Abbott v. Burke, 20 A.3d 1018, 1023–24 (2011). 
 327. SCHOOL FUNDS—PUBLIC SCHOOLS—MAINTENANCE AND SUPPORT, 2007 NJ Sess. Law 
Serv. Ch. 260 (ASSEMBLY 500) (WEST). 
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by districts with high concentrations of at-risk students.”328 When the state 
later in 2011 reduced funding levels substantially below what its own 
legislation would have indicated was appropriate, it put the New Jersey 
Supreme Court in a far better position than most other courts to intervene. 
To be sure, the court did not order a remedy as broad as the plaintiffs had 
requested,
329
 but it did, despite the recession, successfully compel the 
legislature to restore substantial funds to education.
330
 In short, New Jersey 
offers a prime example of how structural shifts in decisionmaking and 
their interaction with prophylactic rules can put plaintiffs in a position to 
enforce constitutional rights to education that would otherwise go 
unenforced during times of crisis.  
These virtues aside, however, forcing a state to act in addressing the 
possibility of constitutional violations before they occur can trigger 
critiques that the judiciary is acting beyond its authority. If one accepts the 
premise that the judicial enforcement of constitutional clauses is 
appropriate, which a majority of states do,
331
 these prophylactic measures 
are no more a problem than any prior remedies. They may even be less so. 
First, exigency invites constitutional violations and those violations are 
difficult to stop or remedy after the fact.
332
 In fact, in the context of 
education, courts have rarely remedied past harms or even prevented 
imminent ones.
333
 Unless courts are willing to expressly demand remedies 
for past students, the only feasible remedy is to demand that the state plan 
ahead. Moreover, from an equitable perspective, planning ahead is a small 
burden for the state to shoulder and the only one that will prevent the 
reoccurrence of future inadequacies that would otherwise go un-remedied.  
Second, random deprivations of education across time are indefensible 
in a constitutional system. A quality education is something a student 
receives over the course of his or her academic career and the obligation 
that state constitutions impose on states is the summative whole of a 
 
 
 328. Id. 
 329. Abbott ex rel. Abbott v. Burke, 20 A.3d 1018, 1045 (2011) (only ordering that funds be 
restored to the Abbott districts, not statewide). 
 330. Megerian, supra note 197. 
 331. See generally Rebell, supra note 20, at 1484–87 (discussing plaintiff victories in a majority 
of states). 
 332. See, e.g., McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 456 (1948) (“Power is a heady thing; and 
history shows that the police acting on their own cannot be trusted,” nor excused from warrant 
requirements). 
 333. See generally Liebman, supra note 32 (critiquing the failure to remedy the past harms of 
segregation); Decade After Ruling, State Struggles to Fulfill the Promise of Leandro, THE DISPATCH 
(Lexington, N.C.), July 6, 2004, at 3A (indicating that the lead plaintiff in the case was now in law 
school and that state still had not implemented a remedy). 
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student’s career.334 A state that fails its elementary students for a period of 
years may be unable to make up reading, learning, and other deficits later 
in time.
335
 As one study of the recession shows, the students in two states 
suffered sustained cuts of more than 20% between 2008 and 2014.
336
 A 
separate study of student achievement gaps indicates that these results are 
equivalent to an entire year’s worth of learning.337 Five other states cut 
education by 15% or more.
338
 These students may very well finish their 
education and work careers a step behind what the state constitution 
requires.
339
  
If state constitutional education mandates mean anything, they mean 
that the quality of education a student receives is not based upon the 
random year in which the student was born and attended school. While a 
statutory right to education might alleviate states of that burden, 
constitutional rights do not. Thus, absent some compelling justification or 
proposed alternative solution by the state, the state, cannot as a practical 
matter, deny its responsibility to plan ahead. 
Third, the quality and quantity of teachers—the most important aspect 
of a quality education—that exist at any given moment are a product of a 
much larger and longer teacher pipeline that stretches across several 
preceding years.
340
 The shortages experienced this past fall were neither 
surprising, nor susceptible to immediate remedy.
341
 The signs of that 
impending shortage had been apparent for years and the result of various 
 
 
 334. As the New Hampshire Supreme Court extensively detailed, the constitutional mandate 
“extends beyond mere reading, writing and arithmetic. It also includes broad educational opportunities 
needed in today’s society to prepare citizens for their role as participants and as potential competitors 
in today’s marketplace of ideas.” Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor, 635 A.2d 1375, 1381 (N.H.1993). 
Or as the state’s legislature indicated as early as 1647, students should “be instructed ‘so far as they 
may be fitted for the University.’” Id. (quoting legislative history). 
 335. See, e.g., GORDON MACINNES, IN PLAIN SIGHT 101 (2009) (“[P]riority must go to teaching 
primary grade students to read and write English well . . . [because] schools only have a few years to 
make certain that children can read by age nine,” a critical point of development); Rebell, supra note 
52, at 1861. 
 336. MICHAEL LEACHMAN ET AL., CTR. ON BUDGET AND POL’Y PRIORITIES, MOST STATES 
FUNDING SCHOOLS LESS THAN BEFORE THE RECESSION 1 (May 20, 2014), http://www.cbpp.org/ 
research/most-states-funding-schools-less-than-before-the-recession. It is the same author but with a 
slightly earlier publication date. 
 337. Jackson et al., supra note 36. 
 338. Leachman et al, supra note 12. 
 339. Rebell, supra note 52, at 1861. 
 340. See generally LINDA DARLING-HAMMOND, THE FLAT WORLD AND EDUCATION: HOW 
AMERICA’S COMMITMENT TO EQUITY WILL DETERMINE OUR FUTURE 163–93 (2010) (comparing our 
system for developing and recruiting teachers to other countries). 
 341. See, e.g., SUCKOW & PURDUE, supra note 5; THE METLIFE SURVEY OF THE AMERICAN 
TEACHER: CHALLENGES FOR SCHOOL LEADERSHIP 4 (2013) (indicating teachers’ job satisfaction was 
at its lowest point in twenty-five years). 
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education policies that preceded it.
342
 And once these policies moved 
people out of the teaching pipeline, curing teacher shortages in the short-
term became impossible. Thus, the solution to inconsistent access to 
education’s most valuable resources is to develop and protect the teaching 
pipeline.
343
  
Finally, prospective remedial directives are not entirely new. Past 
judicial remedies are prospective in so far as they have been aimed at 
securing a constitutional system moving forward. The only meaningful 
difference is how far into the future this Article’s proposed prophylactic 
structures would ask states to plan. These structures would extend the 
prospective timeline, but do so only with the certainty that the greatest 
crises require the greatest planning. In short, prophylactic structures may 
be different in scope, but not in kind.  
CONCLUSION 
Deprivations of the constitutional right to education are not new, but 
over the course of four decades preceding the Great Recession, courts 
intervened to hold these deprivations in check. In some states, legislatures 
responded with massive remedies. More often, plaintiffs brought states 
into court several times before seeing something akin to a reasonable 
remedy. Within a few years of enacting a remedy, some states backslid 
into inequitable and inadequate funding. A few states were seemingly 
scared straight, never to return to court, changing their entire approach to 
education funding and management.  
All of this is to acknowledge that school funding litigation is not a 
panacea. The litigation flaws, however, are more a product of separation of 
powers limitations and the complexity of educational quality than they are 
judicial timidity. If there was one constant between the 1970s and 2008, it 
was a willingness of most courts to recognize and stand up for the 
constitutional right to education. This reality kept legislatures more honest 
than they otherwise would have been, ensured students had a venue to 
 
 
 342. See, e.g., Valerie Strauss, The Real Reasons Behind the U.S. Teacher Shortage, WASH. POST 
(Aug. 24, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/answer-sheet/wp/2015/08/24/the-real-reasons-
behind-the-u-s-teacher-shortage/ (citing challenges to tenure, and the pressures stemming from 
unreliable teacher evaluation systems as cause of shortage). 
 343. School finance litigation has almost entirely ignored the teaching pipeline. Given the 
complexities of teacher labor markets and pipelines, a complete explanation of maintaining teaching 
quality is beyond the scope of this Article. It suffices to say here that courts could, as they might with 
the education budgeting process, direct states to focus on the long term pipeline of teacher 
development and retention, not just the question of current teacher salaries and inequities. See 
generally DARLING-HAMMOND, supra note 340. 
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challenge deplorable educational offerings, and destabilized the status quo 
of inequality enough that progress became possible. 
The Great Recession seriously threatened all these new norms, not 
because violations were more likely to occur, but because courts were no 
longer willing to defend the constitutional rights they previously 
recognized. In effect, courts exited from the education rights enforcement 
business over the past decade. This judicial withdrawal seemingly 
emboldened states to make unnecessarily deep cuts to education and 
ignore the need to remedy the cuts when state revenues rebounded. Now, 
nearly a decade removed from the beginning of the recession, the state 
constitutional right to education and the governmental commitment to 
public education have been cast in serious doubt.  
This experience offers a hard lesson in promises and pitfalls of the 
constitutional right to education: serious crises make education rights 
enforcement dangerous and potentially irrelevant in the short term. But the 
answer cannot be to wait until legislatures are more amenable to judicial 
enforcement of rights. This route only further undermines the judiciary 
and the rights it seeks to enforce, now and in the future. The solution is for 
courts to consistently enforce education rights with one eye on current 
violations and the other on the ability to avoid future crisis. From this 
perspective, the judicial flaw of this past recession was that the judicial 
opinions and enforcements that preceded the recession had never served as 
deterrents against constitutional violations, never articulated clear rules, 
never forced the state to plan ahead, and never prompted the state to 
change the way it made education decisions. The solution moving forward 
is for courts to immediately pursue these ends. Only then might they 
reconstitute the right to education and avert the next education crisis.  
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